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PERMANENT ADDRESS / RÉSIDENCE FIXE

Ste 3001000 McClure StreetVICTORIA, B.C.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT ROLES
IN HOCKEY

by



JACK M. GIBSON

A THESIS

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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT ROLES IN HOCKEY submitted by JACK M. GIBSON in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS.

Clara J. Stohr

.....
Supervisor

W. A. Smith

.....
Murray Smith
.....

Date *May 23 1975*

DEDICATION

To all the female companions who gave me inspiration to complete such a difficult task.

ABSTRACT

An analysis of the North American hockey scene reveals that violent behavior of varying forms appears to be becoming more entrenched in the hockey subculture. The extent to which violence has permeated the hockey subculture has given rise to much concern on the part of government officials, league officials, spectators, players and the general public. At present, the process through which hockey players are socialized appears to lend itself to the acceptance of violent behavior as a dimension which is required to become a successful hockey player. Research indicates that overt behavior and violence in the hockey subculture may, in large part, be explained by social learning theory: violence displayed on the ice is learned or acquired through a combination of modelling, instruction, and differential reinforcement. As a direct result, acceptable forms and degrees of aggression have been subverted in many cases by unacceptable and illegal violence.

The study utilized three distinct methods in examining the nature and causes of violence in hockey: (1) the primary method was the participant-observer approach characteristic of the occupational socialization; (2) documentary research which screened media reports, official publication from various organizational levels of hockey, and a number of studies commissioned to examine hockey violence; and (3) an unstructured interview with a sample of pre-professional and professional players.

Data was gathered to examine the relationship between hockey violence and the two prevailing theories of aggression and violence: (1) instinct, and (2) social learning.

A conceptual analysis of the data led to the identification of five distinct, violent roles: the policeman, goon, intimidator, antagonist, and stickman. The processes associated with selection and socialization into these roles is described. The important influences of professional hockey on violence in amateur hockey are identified and suggestions for constructive change outlined.

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CHAPTER I

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1960's, a great deal of attention has been paid by scholars and other observers to the phenomenon of increasing violence in our society. Historically, violence has always been part of the reality of our social life. Violence is an emotionally loaded subject, and has many more extensive implications than are apparent on the surface. When looking beneath the surface for the causes of violence, including those that are seemingly remote, we are apt to find raw truths that may not be easily accepted. Trends towards violence, aggression, and dehumanization are often traced to an overly competitive, supposedly liberalized system.

During the past few years many researchers have focused their interests on violence and aggression in sport. Some apparently perceive sport primarily as a medium through which they may attempt to develop some understanding of human aggression; others seem to be more concerned that violence threatens that which they consider good in sport (M.D. Smith, 1974). It is in this latter regard that the present study was directed.

The relationship between sport, aggression, and violence is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon which has no single antecedent or cause. This is not to say, however, that one kind of explanation may not be more useful than another.

When viewing sports competition we are able to observe variations in rate and type of aggression and violence, thus providing us at least an approach to understanding it. In sports there are many forms of aggressive behavior utilized by participants. Expression of these forms may be interpreted in terms of basic theories of aggression; firstly, the instinct theory whereby human aggression is considered to be innate to man, and secondly, the social learning theory whereby human aggression is considered to be acquired or learned through cultural indoctrination and socialization processes. This study will attempt to utilize the two basic theories in understanding violence and aggressive behavior in the ice-hockey subculture.

Sports competition, by its very nature, aggravates and intensifies aggressive tendencies, which often result in violence (Alderman, 1973). Aggression has become acceptable within the North American sports culture. When channelled and directed into suitable forms aggression becomes a legitimate part of sports. The problem arising today however, is that these acceptable forms and display of aggression have been in many cases subverted by illegitimate overt behavior, thus bringing violence to the scene. It is the violence which has permeated the sports culture, and specifically hockey, that this study focuses upon.

II. PURPOSE AND RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

There have been few empirical investigations of a systematic nature concerned with sport violence in North America.

Perhaps surprising is the relatively little attention paid to the sport of hockey. One would think a sport such as hockey that has a great deal of physical contact and allows for the outlet of aggression as it does, would come under close scrutiny when investigating the causes of and nature of violence in sports. Since hockey is one of the most blatantly aggressive of athletic pastimes, it provided a useful model in the investigation of violence and aggressive behavior in sports. Today's hockey provides a powerful portrayal of the permeation of violence in the sports subculture. Violence behavior of varying forms appears to be becoming more entrenched in the hockey subculture (M.D. Smith, 1971a, 1972a, 1972b, 1972c, 1973b, 1974; Vaz, 1972).

Of major concern when dealing with violence in hockey is the subsequent side effects. It is evident now that violence which has been condoned and often even approved in the adult hockey population (pre-professional and professional), is being adopted by the minor hockey structure. The concern arises when the "pro-style" behaviors are carried down into the minor systems. Although professional sport is often a highly entertaining and successful enterprise it does not constitute an appropriate model for the play of youngsters (Botterill, 1972). Studies such as M.D. Smith (1972a, 1974), Vaz (1972), and McPherson (1974) reveal just how much "legitimized violence" has crept into the minor system. Whether this violence in the minor system has become the product of professional hockey or just an extension of the

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total scene, would in itself call for further investigation.

There has been a definite neglect to the systematic study of hockey from a sociological perspective with regard to violence and aggression at the professional level. This lack of concern is even more surprising in view of recent criticisms of hockey by government officials, league officials, game officials, spectators and players (McMurtry, 1974; Alberta Amateur Hockey Association, 1971). Studying violence and aggression in hockey can perhaps give one a better indication of what to expect, and how to cope with the violence which might confront coaches, players and officials.

While there has been a great deal of speculation, relatively little research has focused on this problem. This study will attempt to generate more precise understanding of this problem. The participant-observation method appeared well-suited to the nature of the study. The author felt that this method was most appropriate in view of the kind of information required. Sociologists and researchers (McCall, 1967; Whyte, 1967; Polsky, 1967; Yablonsky, 1962) have utilized this format to good effect and suggest that it is the most useful approach for obtaining the kind of data required to describe a particular subculture and its role structure. Further justification for the use of this method will be discussed in Chapter III.

III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The central purpose of the study was to investigate the nature and causes of violence in the North American hockey sub-culture. Specifically, the study attempted to better understand the violence in both amateur and professional hockey, through a description of the socialization of violence at the pre-professional (i.e., junior) and the professional levels. The study also attempted to assess the relative merits of the two dominant explanations of violence and aggression in sport, social learning and instinct, in understanding violence in hockey.

Sub-problems are:

1. An investigation into the trends and behavior of players who use violence and overt aggression as an occupational tool. By defining and describing the various roles the study will hopefully offer some possible answers to this social problem that has jeopardized hockey in the last decade.
2. A discussion of mass media, spectators, the management-orientated profit syndrome, and the effects these have on influencing the players' roles.
3. The effect that significant others (coaches, parents, officials and peers, etc.) have on the selection process of violent roles.

4. The net effect of the pre-professional and professional levels of hockey on violence.

IV. DEFINITION OF TERMS

Amateur

Amateur is one who engages in sport on a non-professional basis. The individual does not make his livelihood from sport, and does not hold a contract with a team in a recognized professional league.

American Hockey League (A.H.L.)

American Hockey League is a development league for major professional hockey leagues. The AHL is itself a professional league.

Antagonizer

Antagonizer is a term used in sport which refers to players who frustrate and aggravate their opponents, without resorting to physical intimidation; a mild form of intimidation.

Assault

An attack by physical means; an attempt or threat to do bodily violence or injury to another individual, usually in the form of "fisticuffs".

Behavior

The actions an individual exhibits as a result of internal motivation and interaction with the environment.

Canadian Amateur Hockey Association (C.A.H.A.)

Canadian Amateur Hockey Association is an amateur body representing Canada.

Central Hockey League (C.H.L.)

Central Hockey League is a development league for major professional leagues located in the United States of America. The CHL is itself a professional league.

Counter role

The action of an individual which influences in some way the expectations and/or actions of another; there are usually many counter roles involved.

Eastern Amateur Hockey League (E.A.H.L.)

Eastern Amateur Hockey League was a development league for minor professional leagues prior to 1974.

Emulation

To strive to equal or excel; a process whereby one attempts to imitate another individual, usually a significant other person.

Frustration

The direct or indirect result of the blocking of a person's desired goal; when one's efforts are thwarted. (i.e., not being able to score a goal in hockey).

Goon

A term used in hockey which refers to an individual whose purpose is to assault or violently attack opponents; usually kept on the team only because of his physical "toughness".

Instrumental Aggression

Instrumental aggression is aggression whereby the purpose is to achieve some goal, that being winning. The primary goal is not injury to the opposition, but attainment of a reward.

International Hockey League (I.H.L.)

International Hockey League, a development league for minor professional leagues, located in the United States. The IHL is itself a professional league.

Intimidation

Intimidation is the use of threats or violence to influence the actions of others; the condition of being frightened by threats; can be physical or verbal.

Junior Draft

A process used in sports for drafting young players; in hockey the draft age is nineteen, with some exceptional eighteen year olds. Professional teams select players in inverse order of the previous year's final league standing. For example, if a particular team finished last in point standings, they would receive first pick in the draft.

Mass Media

Mass Media refers to the various methods of mass communication, such as the radio, newspaper, television, magazines, etc.

North American Hockey League (N.A.H.L.)

North American Hockey League, newly founded in 1974, is a major development league of the World Hockey Association. The NAHL is itself a professional league.

National Hockey League (N.H.L.)

The National Hockey League; until 1972 the only major profession hockey league in North America.

Normative Reference Group

A group or individual which is thought of as a distributor of approval or disapproval for various alternatives of an individual's behavior in defined situations; provides the individual with a guide to action.

Physical Coercion

An act to physically (bodily) restrain or constrain by force, through legal or illegal tactics.

Policeman

Policeman is a term used in sports which refers to physically "tough" players, whose job is to protect their team-mates from the opposition who are employing "rough" tactics. The policeman is usually very adept in the art of fighting and similar behaviors.

Professional

Professional is an individual who engages in sport for pay as a vocation. The professional holds a contract with a team in a recognized professional league.

Professional Scout

Professional scout is an individual hired by a professional sports team to recruit new players to the team. The "scout" usually travels throughout the various amateur and semi-professional leagues for recruitment purposes.

Reactive Aggression

Reactive aggression has as its purpose injury or harm to another with both perception of the other person as a threat or noxious stimuli and the emotion of anger necessary concomitants.

Reinforcement

Reinforcement is feedback as a result of action; positive in terms of encouragement or reward, or negative in terms of discouragement or punishment.

Retaliation

Retaliation occurs as a result of an individual's behavior and/or act against another. It may be verbal or physical in nature.

Role Model

Role model is an individual or group who provides another individual with a frame of reference; it demonstrates for the

individual how something is done, in the technical sense.

Rookie

Rookie is a new recruit; a term commonly used in sports which refers to first year players on the team, regardless of age.

Rule-governed

Rule-governed is action which has been sanctioned legal under the rules of the game; have become legitimized and governed by predescribed rules.

Semi-professional

Semi-professional is a sports term used which refers to minor leagues; often it is the development league of a major league franchise.

Southern Hockey League (S.H.L.)

Southern Hockey League, newly founded in 1974; is a development league for the World Hockey Association, and minor professional teams of the National Hockey League. The S.H.L. is itself a professional league.

Significant Others

Significant others are persons in an individual's environment who act as an influential reference group. Those persons (sport heroes) valued and held in esteem by an individual; also peers, parents and coaches.

Socialization

Socialization is the process whereby a person acquires sensitivity to social stimuli and learns to get along with, and behave like others in his group or culture; the social process whereby persons learn to become participants in their society. It is the process whereby individuals become socialized into roles.

Stickman or Hatchet-man

Stickman or hatchet-man is a term given to a hockey player who consistently uses his stick as a weapon for the infliction of violent behavior by the use of his hockey stick.

Values

Values are concepts of the desirable; tied to morality and appear to be highly dependent on past environmental reinforcement.

Veteran

Veteran is a term used in sports which refers to players who have played longer than one year on a team; an experienced individual.

Violence

Violence is aggression to the point of physical harm and destruction; the use of physical force to inflict injury. In this study it will be used synonymously with overt, reactive aggression. For purposes of the study the author does not

consider the application or use of force within the strict rules of the game as "violence".

World Hockey Association (W.H.A.)

World Hockey Association; newly founded major professional league in North America in 1972.

Western Hockey League (W.H.L.)

Western Hockey League, until 1974 was a development league for major professional leagues; now defunct.

V. FORMAT OF THESIS

In this initial chapter the author introduced the relevance of violence and its association with sports, specifically hockey. Having outlined the purposes and need for such a study, and the basic problems which the study focused on, the following chapter turned its attention to a review of related literature.

Chapter II deals mainly with documentary research on violence in sport and studies relating to hockey violence. Included in the chapter is a presentation of the various theories of aggression and violence with relation to sport and a review of influencing factors which affect violence in hockey.

Methods and procedures which were used in researching and collecting data for the thesis are described in Chapter III.

Chapter IV deals with the formal organization of North American hockey, and the hockey subculture from the standpoint of role sets and role relationships.

Chapter V deals more explicitly with the violent and aggression-oriented roles available in pre-professional and professional hockey, and how players become socialized into the various roles.

Chapter VI discusses and interprets the various theories of aggression and violence from the data collected, and the effect of professional violence on the total hockey scene. Also included is a brief discussion of possibilities for change.

The final chapter presents a summary and some recommendations for future study.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The review of the literature has been divided into three main areas; the first section dealing with violence and aggression in sport generally, the second section with the theories of aggression in relation to sport, and the third section dealing with violence and aggression in relation to hockey specifically.

I. VIOLENCE AND AGGRESSION IN SPORT

Although there is a great deal of speculation and concern nowadays, it is extremely difficult to find systematic research which focuses on sports violence. One reason for the neglect may be that North American society has underestimated the extent of violence in sports. Tradition has shaded our eyes from acting against violent behavior. This may be due to the fact that violence in sport, whether legal or illegal, has been invested with an aura of legitimacy, qualities of "rightness", "goodness", or "justifiability" have by collective judgement been attributed to it, and a system of formal and informal sanctions has enforced this judgement (Ball-Rokeach, 1972). A common adage that has been quoted time and time again is, "Why change the existing structure, we've had it around for some twenty years". In some sporting environments violent behavior is tolerated, approved, propagated, and

rewarded.

Violence and the expression of overt aggressiveness is a part of the "very age and body of the time". The indifference which has made all this possible is itself a predisposing factor (Wertham, 1969:1). Our cultural and psychological atmosphere is charged with the electricity of violence. Force and violence are deeply embedded in our whole economic process, sports included. Our society is constantly exposing the youth to overt forms of violent behavior through the sports media. Children are influenced greatly by what they observe in the real world or through the mass media (Bandura and Walters, 1963). A child is continually taking the attitude and emulating the behavior of those around him, particularly those who in some sense control him and on whom he depends, such as coaches, parents and sport heroes (Mead, 1934).

Man seeks drama and excitement; when he cannot achieve satisfaction on a reasonably high level, he often creates for himself the drama of violence (Fromm, 1974). Much of this creation is in the form of violent games and sports. It is safe to assume that sports have become a victim of cultural violence (Wertham, 1969). Of main concern here is the nature of our society and its tendency to embrace violence in its athletes. Sports can be called a form of civilized violence that parallels the controlled, but nevertheless universally generated, violence of real life

(Dunning, 1971). Competition, conflict, and the outbreaks of violence are common features of social life (Dunning, 1971). The playing field is no exception. Fights among players and riotous behavior on the part of spectators, particularly in hockey, are almost everyday occurrences.

Sports have been proclaimed as one of the most influential peace-producing agencies of our time, yet conflict and controversy are as much the norm as are peace and harmony. (Dunning, 1971). John Farina, an outspoken critic of violence in sport, feels the key to understanding violence in modern day sport is to examine the reasons for the prevalence of violence in today's society. When projecting the cultural indoctrination of violence into sports, Farina in his article "We're All to Blame for Violence in Sports" best sums it up by stating:

Perhaps the blood lust of the spectator is a true reflection of the values of society. Is the exaggerated emotionalism of the spectator a safety value or a true representation of a socially immature population struggling to achieve self-realization in a technically sophisticated society (Farina, 1969:120).

Reuel Denney (1969), a sociologist who specializes in the study of sport, notes:

...the sport public often responds with an ugly eagerness to the promotion of sports sadism and masochism. Perhaps it even brings to the sport arena...a brutishness that reminds us of lynch law, Texan male compulsives, and child-hating antivivisectionists. (1969:343).

When researching the literature it was interesting to note that the majority of North American society feel violence is

an essential necessity. Martin Goldfarb (1970), a Toronto-based private consultant, recently published a report on the attitudes of Canadians towards violence. He found that more than half the population believe violence is in some way a basic need, that violence is inevitable, sometimes even beneficial in our society. The average individual views life as a tough "dog-eat-dog" struggle, in which some violent behavior is necessary for survival. A sampling of Goldfarb's interviews confirm this:

People need violence, especially in 1970.

We are all animals and we also have some of the basic instincts of violence. (Goldfarb, 1970: 129).

In the report Goldfarb included questions regarding the use of violence in sporting events. It was interesting to note that some forty percent of Canadians like to watch fighting at hockey games. It seems that North Americans fear and enjoy their aggression at the same time, and thus have difficulty in pinning down the inner meanings of external violence. An example of this is the Canadian attitude towards hockey, it demonstrates a forceful need to define, limit, and conventionalize the symbolism of violence in sports.

Psychologist Martin Weiler views violence in sports in an unique way, similar to that of Eric Dunning, a sport sociologist. Weiler (1972) suggests that the underlying objective of all contact sports depends on a peculiar kind of balance between a high control of the level of violence and aggressiveness, and the preservation of a sufficiently high level of non-violent fighting.

In accordance with the former, without violence the game would no longer be acceptable to most players and spectators, and as for the latter, over violent behavior would meet wide-spread disapproval among players and public. It would appear that the above phenomenon regarding balance of violence is being questioned as to its effects in today's society.

II. THEORIES OF AGGRESSION IN RELATION TO SPORT

Basic Types of Aggression

Before reviewing the literature on aggression and violence, let us first look at aggression itself. Although aggression may come in many forms there are basically two major types of aggression in human beings. The first type is commonly known as reactive or goal aggression, which has as its purpose (or goal) injury or harm to another person with both perception of the other person as a threat or noxious stimuli and the emotion of anger being necessary concomitants (Alderman, 1973; Layman, 1968). The second type is known as instrumental aggression whereby the purpose is to achieve some goal, that being winning. The primary goal is not injury to the opposition, but attainment of a reward; although injury or harm may be a by-product. For reactive aggression, the major reinforcer is the stimulus of the victim suffering injury or being in pain; for instrumental aggression, the major reinforcer is an extrinsic reward (Alderman, 1973; Layman, 1968).

The majority of athletic competition falls into the domain of instrumental aggression (Layman, 1968). That is, the athlete

attempts to defeat his rival because of the satisfaction he will experience from proving his own competence, and because of the praise and approval he will receive, but he is not really angry at his opponent (Layman, 1968). In the pursuit of victory, injury often occurs in sports competition simply because of the body contact involved. However, many coaches are now convincing their players that physically injuring or harming opposing players is sometimes the only way to win, therefore, in this sense, instrumental aggression in competitive sports is being replaced by reactive aggression. The latter is also referred to as conformist aggression (McPherson, 1974; Alderman, 1973; Smith, 1972; Fromm, 1974; Berkowitz, 1968). Conformist aggression (Fromm, 1974) comprises various acts of aggression that are performed not because the aggressor is driven by the desire to injure, but because he is told to do so and considers it his duty to obey. One might ask, if an athlete does not have a drive for this type of aggression why does he perform against his principles? The impulse not to obey or not to conform constitutes for many a real threat, (such as being insulted, benched, or cut from the team) against which they defend themselves by performing the required aggressive act.

A type of aggression which is a basic quality required in sports, and closely associated with instrumental aggression is self-assertive aggression. Successful performance, as in winning, is possible only when the athlete involved is self-assertive enough to pursue his aim with determination and without being deterred by obstacles (Fromm, 1974). In Fromm's explanation of self-assertive

aggression one must "differentiate between aggression with the aim to injury or harm and self-assertive aggression that only facilitates the pursuit of a goal."

Aggression as Innate Behavior

Among the early explanations of aggression was that by Freud (1930), who postulated that aggression is innate to man. In the last decade Freud's belief that aggression is innate was further studied by Lorenz (1964), Ardrey (1961, 1966), and Tiger (1969). Ardrey and Lorenz argued that man is by instinct an aggressive creature, and it is this innate propensity to violence that accounts for individual and group aggression. Ashley Montague's reaction to this view is skeptical; he argues that both explanations suffer from the same fatal defect, namely, extrapolation from animal to man. He infers that there is no evidence to prove this alleged phylogenetically adapted instinctive behavior is in any way relevant to the motive-forces of human behavior (Montague, 1968: 11).

Lorenz pleads with some eloquence that human's replace competition for living space with competition in sports. Lorenz feels that sport aggressiveness can be in certain instances acquired or enhanced in controlled situations, but that there will always be "the fighting instinct in man". He suggests that sports probably educates man to a conscious and responsible control of his own fighting urge (Lorenz, 1966:242). Lorenz feels that the causation for fighting in sports is due to "an internal urge to attack".

Campbell (1971) supports Lorenz's hypothesis that "basically athletes have an instinctual urge to attack and actually seeks the opportunity to indulge in fighting". Campbell feels that not all athletes readily display this urge but do in fact possess it. Clarence Campbell, president of the National Hockey League, feels that fighting is the best "safety value" available in sports, in hockey specifically.

All the works dealing with the innateness hypothesis follow basically the same thesis:

...man's aggressive behavior as manifested in war, crime, personal quarrels, competition, and all kinds of destructive and sadistic behavior is to be a phylogenetically programmed, innate instinct which seeks for discharge and waits for the occasion to be expressed (Montague, 1968: 13).

Aggression as a Reaction to Frustration

When viewing the research regarding both the innate-instinctual theory and the social learning theory, one might ask: is there any linkage between the two basic theories of aggression? If there is a linkage it would most likely come from the frustration-aggression hypothesis. In 1939 a group of Yale psychologists, Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears advanced a two-part frustration-aggression hypothesis: "...the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression" (Clark, 1964). The frustration-aggression hypothesis and

its criticisms have been reviewed extensively by Sargent (1948), Funkenstein (1957), Stacy and Demartino (1958), Berkowitz (1958, 1962), McNeil (1959), Buss (1961), Yates (1962), and Alderman (1973).

Alderman supports Sargent's (1948) earlier thesis that,

...frustration arouses a "pronounced emotional reaction" - that emotion is the core of reaction to frustration. The emotion aroused may be broad and diffused (generalized anger or fear) of specific (hostility, shame, jealousy, etc.) and depends upon how the individual interprets the whole precipitating situation (Alderman, 1973:35).

Alderman (1973) feels that "most aggression in sports results from frustration". He suggests that "this frustration is the result of various motives being thwarted or blocked." In his discussion of these various motives involved he states:

Those motives predominant in sport which usually generate aggression when thwarted revolve around achievement, dominance, power, recognition and prestige, and excellence. For example, if a boy places high incentive value on one or a combination of these motive-incentive systems, and he is blocked from attaining or satisfying them, then he becomes frustrated,...which often results in aggression toward the frustrating agent (Alderman, 1973:35).

It would appear from the literature on the frustration-hypothesis that this theory does not alone account for aggression and that it must be explained in conjunction with the social learning theory, rather than the instinctual theory. The frustration-aggression hypothesis did serve as a stimulus for further studies of aggression and as a result, modifications of previous

theories were presented. Nowadays, most psychologists have taken the point of view that aggressive behavior in human beings is learned behavior acquired by means of conditioning (Bandura and Walters, 1963; Hicks, 1965; McPherson, 1974 and Johnson, 1972).

Aggression and Violence as Learned or Acquired Behavior

During the period when the traditional innate/instinctual theories were being studied, researchers were taking an alternate approach to aggression, that being aggression is acquired or learned. Psychologists, Bandura and Walters (1963), Davis (1949), Sears, Maccoby and Levin (1957), Bandura and Ross (1961), Hicks (1965), Rokeach (1969), Meyer (1972), and Johnson (1972) have in some respects encompassed a social learning theory of aggression. There are many facets to this theory, but all are convergent with the premise that aggression and violence are learned through socialization processes and cultural indoctrination which our society dictates.

The literature on socialization and social learning behavior seems to indicate that a child becomes socialized into sport in much the same manner that one becomes socialized into any mode of behavior (Orlick, 1972). Identification and imitation are the two indirect means by which the young are socialized in society and in the sport milieu (McNeil, 1969). A child's actions, attitudes and skills are all reinforced by significant others and models to which he is exposed (Bandura and Walters, 1963). In sports, both the social behavior and the mechanical performance of skills associated with the game are learned by imitating role models who appear to possess the desired skills. The most influ-

ential and most frequently imitated models are those who are highly successful (i.e., professional superstars), those who are highly visible (i.e., those who are on television), and those who appear to be in prestigious positions in the sport culture (Bandura and Ross, 1961; McPherson, 1974).

In sociological terms, the professional model in sports serves as a reference group in the socialization of aggression and violence (Kemper, 1969). Reference groups are divided into two basic types; first the normative group, which is thought of as a distributor, or potential distribution of approval or disapproval for various behaviors by the group (Jackson, 1966). The normative group through approval or disapproval sets up norms and values. It may be that the professional style of play condones and encourages violence, thus giving its approval for such actions. This approval is accepted by the players as normative behavior. The second type of reference group is the role model. The role models are usually professional heroes whom the actor identifies with in sports. When young players see that professionals are successful and become rewarded for their violent behavior, then they too may likely resort to this type of behavior (Bandura and Walters, 1963). Surprisingly enough, Bandura and his associates found that imitation will occur even when the young child dislikes the model's attributes, providing the latter is highly successful in obtaining social or material rewards for their behavior. It is not necessary that the model be rewarded in the observer's presence (Bandura, 1969).

When role models serve as normative reference groups, their influence may be especially powerful (Kemper, 1969). Young athletes who tend to select from the array of models available to them "favorite players" who are violent may themselves be inclined to adopt the same style of play. There is certainly no shortage of violent models in sports, and these violent professional models are extremely prestigious and highly rewarded (M.D. Smith, 1972).

In related studies by Bandura and Walters (1963) it showed that players who get approval for violence are attracted to those who model violence. They make a strong case for the nefarious effects that the harmful behaviors of the model have upon the observing child. On television young children may be exposed to violence in sports several times a week. The alarming fact surrounding this is that children were found to invent new forms of aggression, after observing adult aggression on film. (Bandura and Walters, 1963). Some of this new formed aggression was carried over to game situations. Although observing films and television have a great influence in the modelling process of youngsters, they are not solely responsible for them becoming overly aggressive. Parents and peers also serve as reference groups which give approval for violent behavior. Bandura and Walters (1963) found that parental approval or disapproval of violence influenced a player's behavior in the sporting context. Data is beginning to support this position. For example, hockey

players perceive their parents as somewhat approving of certain violent acts in hockey (M.D. Smith, 1972). With respect to peers, peer responses to aggressive and violent acts have a strong influence in shaping subsequent aggression. Indeed, peers tend to give prestige to players on the basis of the aggressive acts (Bandura and Walters, 1963).

It would appear that Bandura and Walters' (1963) social learning theory of aggression is useful in explaining, at least partially, violence in sport. This is especially so in light of the evidence that imitation of an aggressive prototype is enhanced in environments where such models abound (Bandura and Walters, 1963; M.D. Smith, 1972). Smith clearly summarizes this approach by stating:

Although not yet well-grounded empirically, theory and data at both the psychological and sociological levels suggest that much of the violence in sport is the product of socialization. Owing to apparent widespread approval of violence in sport, together with the prevalence of violent models, violent techniques and attitudes may be socially acquired (Smith, 1972:8).

III. AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE IN RELATION TO HOCKEY

Relatively few research studies have been conducted which explore aggressive behavior and violence in the hockey subculture. Those studies which have investigated the problem were focused mainly on the minor hockey structure, and have paid relatively little direct empirical attention to the professional structure. Although it is hard to make comparisons between amateur and professional subcultures, there are similarities which become relevant to the study, and will be discussed in this section. They

are the socialization processes in minor hockey, the win-at-all costs syndrome, assaultive behaviors in hockey, legitimization of violence in hockey, profiteering in hockey by violence, and government involvement into hockey violence.

Socialization Processes in Hockey (Minor Hockey Specifically)

There is very little research evidence to explain how a boy becomes socialized into the role of a hockey player. Early in life, perhaps as early as five years of age, many Canadian and some American boys find themselves in a value climate which considers hockey to be an important aspect of life (McPherson, 1974). McPherson in his study of the "Social Milieu of Minor Hockey in Canada" states:

Interest in hockey is aroused early, usually by a father or older brother. This interest is subsequently reinforced by the peer groups (who have been similarly initiated within their families) and by the mass media so that by four to six years of age boys are skating and by seven or eight years they are involved in an organized hockey programme. Throughout this period they receive encouragement and approval to play the game from significant others such as parents, siblings, peers, coaches, relatives and neighbours. At the same time they begin to internalize or learn the behavior that is expected of them as hockey players (McPherson, 1974: 11).

M.D. Smith (1971, 1972, 1972a, 1972b, 1974), Vaz (1972, 1974), McPherson (1974), Botterill (1972), McMurtry (1974), and Faulkner (1973, 1974) have all characterized hockey as an occupational subculture in which exists a cluster of norms and supporting values turning on a theme of violence in minor hockey. All support the hypothesis that overt aggressiveness and outward displays of

violent behavior are becoming far too frequent and intense, and are becoming a trend detrimental to hockey, especially at the minor level. They feel that a significant influence on violence in hockey has come from what is happening at the pre-professional and professional levels.

It is not surprising that virtually every boy playing hockey is profoundly influenced by the examples portrayed in the professional ranks.

It is a natural phenomenon for any person to look up to what he has been told are the best, and to attempt to emulate them (McMurtry, 1974: 17).

McPherson (1974) feels that the informal process of socialization of players is one of the basic reasons why hockey, especially at the minor (amateur) level, has become a problem. In summation of the problem McPherson states:

Unfortunately there are no well-defined norms for many social roles found within the structure of minor hockey. As a result, roles are played in many ways and violent deviant behavior often results because of this inability to decide what is the appropriate or inappropriate behavior to be exhibited at a given point in time (McPherson, 1974:12).

Studies such as those conducted by M.D. Smith (1971, 1974) and Vaz (1972, 1974) have shown, in a sociological perspective, the socialization process in which minor hockey players "receive ever increasing injunctions to acquire a repertoire of assaultive skills as tools of the trade" (M.D. Smith, 1974). Vaz' (1972, 1974) study of minor hockey in a Canadian city is illustrative:

Here, boys enter the game at age seven and begin a training at the end of which (around age seventeen) those who have remained in the system emerge as...a tough fighting unit prepared for violence

whose primary objective is to win hockey games (Vaz, 1972:2).

Fighting and other forms of physical coercion are discouraged among younger boys, but at twelve to fourteen years of age the criteria for player evaluation begins to change. In a study of the socialization process in minor hockey (1974) found that:

At the Midget level teaching concentrates on the technical aspects of "playing the man" and the subtle methods of "hitting" the opposing player and "taking him out". It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that the implicit objective is to put the opposing star player out of action without doing him serious injury. Illegal tactics and "tricks" of the game are both encouraged and taught; rough play and physically aggressive performance are strongly encouraged, and sometimes players are taught the techniques of fighting. Minimal consideration is given to the formal normative rules of the game, and the conception of sportsmanship and fair play are forgotten. Evaluation of individual performances (whether deviant or not) is according to their contribution to the ultimate success of the team (Vaz, 1972:230).

The reason for this socialization process at the minor level as described above would appear, from research and personal observation, that these skills and attitudes are those desired by the professional teams, thus providing the rationale for the use of these skills etc. It seems that the minor hockey structure models itself after the professional structure. This is evidenced by the comment of one observer of hockey in Canada, "To watch a hockey game among the youngsters...is to witness a marvel of miniaturization, for these boys are tiny facsimiles of their NHL heroes" (Johnson, 1970).

As noted earlier, much of the socialization of youngsters is due to the influence of "significant others" who are found within the specific settings (Bandura and Walters, 1963; McPherson, 1974). In a report for the Hockey Technical Advisory Committee of the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association, McPherson (1974) was very critical of the parents, coaches and minor hockey league administrators for encouraging violence. In the review McPherson implies that it is the responsibility of the parents, coaches, etc. to instil respect, and to provide a process by which children are socialized in a proper, acceptable manner. The neglect of parents, coaches and minor hockey executives to provide this process has resulted in the problems minor hockey is facing today. The major assumption of his report is that minor hockey has attained the status of a social problem in Canada (McPherson, 1974).

In one of the few studies of professional hockey players Faulkner (1971, 1973) "graphically depicts the fully socialized end-product of the current system" in which the players have become socialized. It might be well to note Faulkner's findings since they have implications and an indirect affect on the socialization of minor hockey.

First, players are obliged to "show themselves": to lay claim to being treated as a certain kind of person. While not the only way of establishing a positive identity, fighting ability and toughness are one important means of doing so, on which impresses coaches and management as well as other players. Such attributes, too, are useful in warding off prospective punishment and retribution. Second, violence is used to test the

"character" of opponents; hopefully, to intimidate and to erode confidence. A "received negative identity" implies that one is easily intimidated. A corollary is that players must never back down before others; it is acceptable to lose a fight but not to turn away from one. Third, players must always back up colleagues who have been set upon; they not only see themselves as obligated to protect one another, but they assess how quickly and skillfully this is done. (Faulkner, 1973:3).

Victory-at-any-Cost Syndrome

Victory has and likely always will be the desired end when individuals or teams compete against one another. There is nothing more enjoyable than to observe athletes after winning a hockey game, or in fact any type of game. It has become evident that due to increasing amounts of violence displayed in hockey, much of the "sweetness" of victory is lost (McMurtry, 1974).

McMurtry (1974) in his report on violence in minor hockey suggests:

When coaches and parents hysterically demand victory at any price they seldom realize just how great the cost is...winning teams leave the arena with players suffering acute injuries or a feeling of bitterness toward opponents as a result of brawls and violent behavior (McMurtry, 1974:27).

The victory-at-any cost orientation to competitive sports appears to be the major cause for undesirable environments and behavior in minor hockey (Botterill, 1972). Botterill in his study of the Canadian hockey environment argues that there has been too much emphasis put on winning, "victory at all costs". The most realistic method of playing sports is to have a balance

of aggressiveness and skill played within the confines of the rules. Botterill believes that winning has become so important that rules are now being broken and the once balanced attack has become aggressive-oriented. Youngsters are now being lead to believe that intimidation, retaliation, and overt assaultive behavior are approved methods to ensure victory. There has been so much emphasis put on winning that the threat of losing has caused youngsters to withdraw (Orlick, 1972).

Botterill (1972), McPherson (1974), M.D. Smith (1972), and McMurtry (1974) all agree that coaches and parents emphasize the importance of winning and the use of aggression to enhance it. The coaches are imposing unrealistic and unreasonable expectations on young players. McPherson (1974:6-8) gives some examples of how coaches and parents have influenced the child's behavior.

Prior to the game one coach was delivering a pre-game pep talk to the players. "You've got to kill those sons-of-bitches." You've got to stick it to them early and let them know who is boss. Now get out there and lay on the lumber." The players who the coach was directing this advice to were bantams, fourteen and fifteen years old.

The classic was the father roaring at his boy to "kill the little s.o.b., son. Rap your stick around his God damn skull." The boy was ten.

Typical is the response of parents' actions attending minor hockey league games and/or practices. A booming voice from across the rink shouting, "Skate, Kenny, Skate. This is no picnic. Skate, Dig in, kid." Another parent shouts to his son, "keep your head up! Keep the puck way out front, don't lose it in your feet, skate, kid, skate! At the end of the practice Kenny's father encourages his tired son to do some wind sprints, and "don't coast." After the son emerges from the dressing

room, Dad is waiting. "You did fine, son. Only you have to push yourself. You can't WIN anything by going at half speed. We have to condition ourselves to win." Kenny was eleven years old.

McMurtry (1974), Botterill (1972) and Leah (1964) suggests that coaches and parents have taken the fun out of hockey by imposing undue pressure on the child. McMurtry comments to the effect:

Children do not instinctively believe that winning is everything in sport. If one has any reason to doubt the truth of that statement you need only recall your own experiences of shinny as a boy. Games lasted for hours. There were endless permutations and combinations of sides. No one kept score, and you could not wait for tomorrow to get back into the game. You measured yourself, by yourself, taking pride in any new move learned or developed. The same holds true today if you watch a road hockey game (McMurtry, 1974:27).

The overriding value of winning in hockey has not eluded the professional level (M.D. Smith, 1973). Smith (1973), Vaz (1973) and Faulkner (1972, 1973) have shown that physical coercion enhances the chances of victory and it is not surprising that coercion is highly regarded. They, along with other psychologists and sociologists, have noted that the "winner" is pre-eminent among North American sport heroes, and because he is by definition the "good guy", "the winner" is given a mandate to use unscrupulous means -violence if necessary- to achieve his ends (Klapp, 1972).

Although research is limited with regard to professional attitudes toward the value of winning, literature suggests that the reward or "pay off" for winning far exceeds any other in-

centive or motive for participation. Success at the professional level of hockey is measured by the teams' "win-loss" statistics (Faulkner, 1973; Blity, 1973). In professional hockey the financial reward for winning, and consequently making the "play-offs" imposes added pressure on players to attain victory, even if it means resorting to violent behavior (M.D. Smith, 1974; Albinson, 1973, 1974). Often this reward system detracts from the original goals and purposes of the game and illegal tactics become the dominating force to enhance victory (McPherson, 1974). Professional hockey is ends oriented rather than means oriented. (Albinson, 1973; Blity, 1973). That is, the end (i.e. winning, success, their own prestige) becomes more important than the means (i.e. what happens during the game, how it is played, etc.). Albinson (1973, 1974) says that the pressure put upon players by this ends oriented structure leads to violence. Winning becomes the ultimate goal and how it is accomplished becomes somewhat irrelevant.

Assaultive Behavior in Hockey

Assault in sports is taken for granted as "part of the game". In the institutionalization of the game, "A way of doing..." has become "...the way of doing" (Ingham and Loy, 1973). Fighting, intent to injure, and various other assaultive behaviors have become a part of hockey as much as stickhandling, shooting and passing. Paul Hoch (1972), refers to hockey as a "gladiatorial game." Hoch feels that fighting has become an integral part of

of hockey. These sentiments are also echoed by Clarence Campbell, president of the National Hockey League, who says:

Fighting is not undesirable, because its' the best safety valve I know of in hockey...International hockey has the "throw out rule" for fighting and it produces a more violent game. In the Russia-Team Canada series (1972), I saw some of the most disgusting incidents - kicking and the use of sticks. I'd far sooner have the "rattat-tat" of fisticuffs than to see people kicked (Toronto Star, June 4, 1974).

When discussing the various assaultive behaviors in hockey, Campbell (1974) ranked fighting fourth or fifth on the list of violent occurrences where the number one concern is the risk of injury. Stick-swinging, spearing and butt-ending ranked above fighting. Ed Chynoweth (1974), president of the Western Canada Hockey League, felt that fighting in hockey was not a major concern when discussing violence in hockey. Where the problem lies in hockey "is the violent acts which involve the stick." He feels that the most feared and serious acts of violence is injury as a result of "stick-work" (Chynoweth, 1974). Both Campbell and Chynoweth feel that "fisticuffs" inhibit more serious offences. That is, if fighting is taken out of hockey, other more serious forms, such as spearing etc., will become dominate, as the case with International Hockey in Europe.

Research regarding fighting indicates that it has become traditional, and the people who control and enforce the structure of the game are somewhat skeptical about changes (McMurtry, 1974; C. Campbell, 1974). The major concern associated with fighting comes from the minor hockey leagues. Minor hockey league officials and

executives feel that fighting is not healthy and should be abolished (Nadin, 1974). They all seem to believe that fighting leads to "brawling" and "brawling" leads to injury and is detrimental to the game at this level. Nadin argues that fighting should not be part of the game. He went on to say that:

The removal of fighting would in no way detract from the skill, excitement, speed and competitive nature of the game...Removal of fighting does not lead to numerous other infractions as an emotional outlet...The misconception that removal of fighting results in an increase in other infractions such as high sticking, spearing, slashing and hooking is completely groundless. Players learn to restrain and control themselves. By allowing fighting, on the other hand, you do not train an individual to restrain or control himself, and as a result numerous other infractions occur (Nadin, 1974:22).

After reviewing the available research on fighting in hockey it would appear there is considerable ambivalence as to its' functional role in the game. At one end of the scale people are defending it's role and refer to fighting as a "safety valve" which is required, and at the other end of the scale people are saying it is detrimental to the game and fighting becomes an approach to the game whereby a desirable end, victory can be achieved by illegal and violent means. No doubt much of the problem stems from a lack of well-defined norms concerning assault, and particularly fighting. Encompassing fighting into one's definition of violence must be explained in detail. From the literature on this matter it would be safe to assume that fighting may take on various forms, and the degree and level of fighting in reference

to violence requires further study. The consensus among the authorities of both levels of hockey, that being amateur and professional (including pre-professionals-junior hockey) is, "what is good for the amateurs is not necessarily good for professionals, and conversely what is good for the professionals is not necessarily good for the amateurs."

Legitimation of Violence In Hockey

In our society there appears to be a strong though mute tendency among us to accept violence in hockey as legitimate (M.D. Smith, 1971). There is a strange interplay between legality and illegality of rules. Research by M.D. Smith (1972) suggests:

They often have little to do with the legitimacy status of an act of violence or overt aggressiveness. For example, widely-held informal norms about how performers should behave appear to buttress many actions which violate official rules. Although formal negative sanctions in the form of penalties are handed out, such sanctions, if widely approved, are in balance rewarded not punished...A great deal of the officially prescribed violence in the National Hockey League is, in fact, normal behavior (M.D. Smith, 1972:2).

It is a broad consensus (M.D. Smith, 1972; Vaz, 1973; McMurtry, 1974; McPherson, 1974) that penalties in hockey are often encouraged rather than frowned upon. When the year-end statistics are released one of the main concerns with players, coaches, management, and the public is the number of minutes in penalties each player receives. Many feel that the number of penalties a player has indicates his aggressiveness. One NHL general manager suggests that, "a home team playing aggressive,

pleasing hockey has to pick up at least five penalties" (Toronto Star, November 21, 1972). In fact, players have actually been offered bonus money for taking good penalties (Edmonton Journal, October 31, 1974). Hockey players learn early what are the "good" and "bad" penalties; the former are encouraged, the latter deplored (Vaz, 1972).

M.D. Smith (1972), in his study of assaultive behaviors of high school hockey players, found that much of the legal and illegal violence in hockey is in no way aberrant; rather it is socially acquired normative behavior. Smith feels that from the research, journalism, and everyday observation, there exists in hockey a "value-climate which fosters the legitimization of legal and illegal violence" (M.D. Smith, 1972). An interesting observation from the literature on violence in hockey is that in North America, players and supporters of hockey form a subculture sharing values supportive of violence, while those more remote from the sport tend to question such conduct.

Profiting by Violence in Hockey

Much of the new found violent behavior which has emerged in pre-professional and professional hockey has been a result of one method used to sell the game - bring out the crowds (C. Campbell, 1974). In recent years where expansion has increased major league hockey considerably, there has been a deliberate attempt to sell hockey to a wide audience in the United States who understand a hockey brawl far more easily than the intricacies and finesse

of the game (Kidd, 1972). This phenomenon is partly due to expansion of the National Hockey League and the newly-founded World Hockey Association. Of the thirty-two league franchises, twenty-four are American owned and operated. It is a possibility that hockey has been structured which caters to the American public. Weiler (1973) notes that violent behavior appeal to Americans, and hockey is a viable substitute for the quick-tempered aggression the average citizen is unable to vent on a frowning society. Weiler comments:

Being in the hockey arena puts us back in the Coliseum cheering the Christians and the lions...Real acts of violence in the United States usually occur when the violator explodes into fury. Hockey is a slick substitute for a desire to commit mayhem. A player smashes an opponent, and fans stand and cheer such a blatant act. It is an isolated act of fury that is not camouflaged by a maze of continual battering. It is pure personal aggression against an irritating foe, and a good tension-release mechanism for Americans who live in a society in which the daggers of violence are flung swiftly, and mostly without blue-print (Weiler, 1973:16).

Weiler (1973) suggests that stick-swinging and fighting spice the game of hockey. If Weiler is right and Americans do like brutality, then it may be that professional hockey does provide legitimate opportunities to at least observe it. The majority of governors and directors of professional hockey are American businessmen. Consciously, or otherwise, they may cater to a national appetite for violence. With the salaries paid players today, owners must fill the arenas to make a profit. In a recent investigation the president of the National Hockey League conceded

that selling tickets was the main purpose of the league. He emphatically stated:

It is the business of conducting the sport in a manner that will induce or be conducive to the support of it at the box office...Show business, we are in the entertainment business and that can never be ignored. We must put on a spectacle that will attract people (C. Campbell, 1974:636).

Owners and managers of the two major leagues feel that they "have to have bloodshed to fill the arenas" (Mehlembacher, 1974). Mehlenbacher refereed in the major leagues for five years and he states, "that is all they were interested in" (Mehlembacher, 1974:18). Hugh MacLennan (1965), analyzed the situation as:

Crude violence has been deliberately encouraged by some owners who think it pays off at the box office, and by coaches and managers whose teams are so crude they know they could not hope to win without it. Inevitably this has placed real hockey skill at a disadvantage, and it has cheated, frustrated and disgusted those who again and again have seen a first-class team disintegrated by alley tactics (MacLennan, 1965:18).

Brian Conacher in the book, Hockey in Canada: The Way It Is (1971), writes:

The growing incidence of brawling in the game, I believe, is not unconnected with the "image" of the game that now is being presented to the violence-oriented American hockey fan. The large numbers of people that are being exposed to the game now are often not aware of the skills and finesse that gives the game its real appeal. But brawling is something they do understand, so far as the game's, television acceptance, and crowd appeal is concerned, it probably doesn't hurt to have a few good brawls. If there is a little blood so much the better for the people with color T.V. sets (Conacher, 1971:114).

Surprisingly enough, some active players feel that most advertising and selling of the game is over emphasizing the fighting and brawling at the expense of educating the crowds about the skill and finesse. They feel owners, management, television and the introduction of hockey to the American public has fostered this new approach to the game (McMurtry, 1974:18).

Bruce Kidd, recent critic of the hockey structure as it is, refers to the Americanization of hockey:

Hockey is a sector of the entertainment industry and each professional team is essentially a branch of the same corporation. The success of each team is not measured in the league standings but in its profit and loss column, although the two are inter-connected (Kidd, 1969:6).

Kidd has expressed what he feels can happen to sports when profitability is the major aim.

If sport is organized on the basis of economics then the values of sports go out the window. As a result of this situation, sport is promoted as organized violence and not as culture or an esthetically, physical-pleasing pursuit. Major League hockey is a multinational entertainment business which promotes organized violence and thrives on an anti-social value system of authoritarianism, elitism, and mayhem (Kidd, 1972a).

Professional hockey has established a monopoly which revolves around profitability and as such has gained controls over resources, product, and markets (Botterill, 1972). This monopoly also includes an exceedingly large portion of amateur hockey, with particular interest directed at the junior age level (pre-professional). For many years this has been the prime "breeding

grounds" for talented sixteen to twenty year olds. For this reason alone Junior hockey strives to emulate the professionals in all respects, including the actions of owners and managers. Although the success of junior hockey is not wholly dependent on large attendance, the owners continue to use professional-structured methods, as previously described, in selling the game.

The violent behavior that transpires in junior hockey in all of Canada has been described as, appalling (McMurtry, 1974a). Verification of this, McMurtry claims, is as close as the nearest newspapers. "One rarely is able to pick up a local newspaper without reading about the fights or brawls that took place last night at the Junior A game (McMurtry, 1974a). Very little is done to stop this because the owners and managers feel it helps draw the crowd - sells tickets. One junior hockey official apparently has become disgruntled with the violent behavior and remarked:

I once enjoyed going to junior hockey games but now I quit going. In the past couple of years the games have turned into brawls and individual jousting matches. I can watch that sort of stuff at home on the television. The amount of good, skillful, and enjoyable hockey is lost in the mayhem offered today. When it changes I'll start going again.

In regard to the above statement, hockey could possibly suffer the same fate as did lacrosse. It is no secret that the great game of lacrosse almost died in Canada largely because the violence in the game got out of hand, and eventually people just stopped going to the games (Conacher, 1970).

Government Involvement in Hockey Violence

The review of Federal and Provincial studies and reports prepared by various commissions have tediously studied the structure of hockey and the problems associated with it in detail. The majority of these studies have dealt with the amateur hockey structure and have neglected to investigate the professional structure. The government, and rightly so, appears to be chiefly concerned with the youth of our society, the area where there is maximum participation. Why focus our attention on a level of the sport which only accounts for 1% of the boys starting out in organized hockey? The government has tacitly admitted that there is a problem in hockey if only by the upsurge of related research in the last three years (McMurtry, 1974:10).

The central concern of government studies is the structure, objectives and philosophy of the various governing bodies in amateur and minor hockey, not with violence per se. In the spring of 1974 the government showed a concentrated effort to rectify the nature and causes of violent behavior in hockey, particularly amateur hockey. Following the aftermath of a violently played hockey game between Hamilton and Bramalea (April 16, 1974), W.R. McMurtry, Q.C., under the auspices of the Ontario government began an investigation and inquiry into violence in amateur hockey with including influences from professional hockey. Although the investigation was instigated by a public hearing into the incidents which took place as a result of the above game, the concern with violence was general

throughout the entire structure of amateur hockey. Thus, after initial hearings of the Hamilton-Bramalea game, the investigation and inquiry was opened in such a manner as to focus its attention on the problem at large. The inquiry offered many recommendations for improvement of the existing structure and concluded that the professionals were responsible for much of the violence which is portrayed in amateur hockey (McMurtry, 1974).

Until now the government both provincial and federal, have failed to make thorough investigations into violence in hockey. Further study is needed by the government, which has at its disposal both financial resources and researchers to accomplish the task.

In view of the research findings and literature discussed in this chapter, it is apparent that many factors may influence aggression and violence in hockey. A large portion of the literature emphasizes the role of social learning in the development of aggressive and violent behavior. In the related literature there seems to have been very little attention paid to the professional subculture. It was the intention of this present study to provide an insight into the norms and values associated with aggression and violence in professional hockey which includes the pre-professional subculture. This study will hopefully provide research material which has not previously been available.

CHAPTER III

METHODS AND PROCEDURE

I. PHASES OF RESEARCH

There were three methods utilized in the collection and analyses of data in the study. The primary method of study was that of participant-observation. In this, the format was structured as in occupational sociology study. The other two methods were documentary research and the interview. Documentary research and interviewing presented an opportunity to collect a greater amount of detailed information which augmented the participant-observation data. The decision to include these methods was also based on the accessibility of both relevant documents and key typical informants. Being an active member of the subculture being studied, the researcher had many of the available resources at his disposal.

II. DOCUMENTARY RESEARCH

The initial phase of collecting data began with documentary research. This technique was carried on throughout the entire study. The majority of this type of data and information focused on the formal structure of hockey through statistics released by investigations, inquiries, hockey yearbooks and guides, reports on violence, hockey news, and newspapers. Almost all types of media reporting of violence and aggression-orientated material were utilized in the gathering of information. During the time in which the study was conducted the media were paying

special attention to the violence that had become associated with hockey, especially at the minor level. This in turn provided the stimulus for newspaper reporting at the professional level, since it was felt that professional hockey had some responsibility for the violence that has become apparent in the minor (amateur) level (McMurtry, 1974).

Collection of Data

The documentary data were gathered between 1972 and 1974, primarily in Toronto and Edmonton. Newspaper data for the study were obtained mainly from the three Toronto newspapers; Toronto Globe and Mail, Toronto Star, Toronto Sun, and the Edmonton Journal, (1971-1974). All the papers in question gave widespread coverage to the major professional hockey leagues (NHL and WHA) and to the major junior or pre-professional leagues (OHA, QJHL and WCHL). They also gave adequate coverage to inquiries and investigations concerning any minor hockey league developments which had relevance to the present problem. Data were also obtained from the Hockey News Ltd., professional year-books and guides, which covered all major hockey leagues in North America. Television coverage was also utilized in the collection process. During the period between 1972 and 1974, the study drew on all means of media coverage which paid any attention to violence and aggression in hockey within the researcher's limits. Part of the study was directed at the pre-professional level of hockey, more commonly known as major

Junior A which includes young players from sixteen to nineteen years old. Subjects and data were chosen from the two major junior leagues in Canada, one in Eastern Canada (OHA) and one in Western Canada (WCHL). These two leagues are considered the highest class of junior hockey and represent the top echelon of talent in their age range. The two leagues are the largest drawing areas for players drafted into professional ranks according to statistics released in the Hockey News, May, 1972-1974. The study was also directed at the professional level where the ages range from about twenty years and up. Subjects and data were chosen from the NHL and WHA, with emphasis placed on the latter. The study involved players, officials, coaches, spectators, management, owners and league officials.

Data from the documentary research were examined with respect to two questions: (1) what is the significance of violence in hockey and its effect on the professional structure and (2) is there any evidence of an increase in violence in hockey over the past decade.

Statistical analysis was derived from team records and personal records kept by league offices in the respective leagues. Statistics included penalty minutes and scoring points throughout regular schedule games and playoffs (Sports Illustrated Professional Hockey Records, 1974).

III. PARTICIPATION-OBSERVATION

The second phase of research was participant-observation in which the researcher used the techniques of the social-anthropologist (E. Whyte, 1967). Since the purpose of the study was to

investigate and describe the hockey subculture, it was felt that the most efficient method to research and describe the subculture was to become an "involved participant observer" (McCall, 1967; Whyte, 1967). In this mode of sociological study the researcher becomes a member of the group he is observing. In this way the participant-observer gets accepted and is able to gather pertinent data, and information concerning the dynamic process of the subculture is more readily obtained. The researcher must remain in the subculture long enough to observe recurring behavioral patterns. Observation as a means of increasing one's knowledge is basic to the investigation of almost any phenomenon (McCall, 1967). McCall (1967) suggests that "studies can only be truly understood and appreciated when they are actually witnessed - seen in the flesh."

Collection of Data

Yablonsky (1962), Whyte (1967), Polsky (1967), Scott (1968), and Jack Scott (1971) have utilized the above method in which the authors have become a part of the subculture being studied. In the case of Whyte and Yablonsky, they attempted to enter into the social milieu in order to become accepted as one of the members. They were at a distinct disadvantage because of their previous background. At first they were considered "outsiders" penetrating "the gang". The major problems encountered were mistrust, suspicion, resentfulness, and uncertainty, all of which play a

vital role to the researcher entering an unfamiliar subculture. It is much easier if the researcher has been "inborn" in the subculture - has been accepted and was an active or past member of the subculture. This was the case of the present author and those cited above.

These people, and other former athletes, have brought to the surface facets of the sporting world which in the past were unseen and in some cases "taboo". They have provided the public with special documentation of what is going on "behind the club-house doors" from the perspective of the participant themselves. Some were personally involved with sport which made it easier to collect information than that of a sociologist entering the sporting establishment without overall approval of all concerned. The operational methods which were used by the previously mentioned authors have been utilized within the present study.

In the present study the researcher was an active playing member of the hockey subculture for over fourteen years; two years as a professional, five years as an intercollegiate player, three years as a pre-professional (junior), and four years in minor hockey. The researcher had a place in the hockey subculture and a role to play. For this reason the possible effect of suspicion and mistrust which is usually present, thus, interviewing, observing and collecting data did not pose any problems. The researcher was accepted and previously established patterns of behavior did not change. No contamination of the group's identity

and integrity occurred. Being accepted and experiencing the various social forces operating, appeared to be the most ideal method for gathering data (McCall, 1969).

It appeared to be in the best interest of the study that the group and all individuals involved be kept unaware of the proceedings and the problem being studied. Although at times it became evident throughout the study that there were individuals who knew of the investigation, nothing appeared to be seriously affected. In some cases it was necessary to reveal the study in order to obtain required data, and in these cases the individuals appeared eager to contribute opinions. In general, a degree of secrecy appeared warranted because the researcher was still an active participant in the game. Revealing the study openly may have caused ill feelings among team-mates, coaches, management and possibly created trying times for the researchers. One might think for a moment about the adverse reactions which previous researchers and authors received when they returned to active duty after publishing books (eg. Bouton, 1970 and Conacher, 1971). Some felt that they had slandered the sport from which they made their living. Consequently these people were treated badly and no doubt caused some personal problems for the authors. The above occurrence accentuates the present researcher's reason for keeping the study undisclosed while collecting data.

While an active participant observer, the researcher played for the Toronto Toros of the World Hockey Association, and attended the training camp of the Edmonton Oilers of the same

league. Although not directly involved with remaining teams in the WHA and the NHL, many of the patterns and dynamics displayed among professional hockey teams are consistent with one another, at least in relation to the present problem. Verification of this phenomenon was done through interviews with other players in both leagues (WHA and NHL). Explanation of the interviews will be done in the next section.

Data Analysis

The analysis of the data collected while a participant observer was done by means of role analysis. The researcher made use of it as a central technique for the analysis of the structure and functioning of the hockey subculture, and for the explanation of individual behavior (Gross, 1958). The concept "role" was used in relation to role analysis to study the behavior of individual hockey player and their interactions with "counter roles". Goffman (1961) found that the concept "role" is the basic unit of socialization. It is through roles that tasks are allocated and arrangements made to enforce their performance (Goffman, 1961). The individual's (hockey player's) role enactment as it occurs through a system of face-to-face social situations with "counter roles". These "counter roles" in hockey are taken by team-mates, coach, owner, officials, opposition, etc. When the various "counter roles" are taken together, they are known as "role sets" (Goffman, 1961). The study was concerned with the "role sets" of the hockey player and the

various interactions of "counter roles".

The study mapped out, both literally and figuratively, the significant "counter roles" that are associated with the hockey subculture. Networks of "positions" or "roles" can be analyzed with respect to either how the incumbents of the "roles" should interact with each other or how they actually do interact with each other (Gross, 1958). In order to provide a basic framework to work from, McCall (1969) devised some key questions that could be subjected to the various roles perceived by each player or groups of players.

1. How the counter roles interact with each other?
2. What unspoken expectations do they have of each other?
3. How does each individual see himself?
4. What expectations must be fulfilled for the role - how much leeway in performance is permitted?
5. Is there any difference in the status of the roles?
6. Are some roles more isolated from observation; how are these roles penetrated?
7. What sort of "props" do individual players use to maintain their roles?
8. What sorts of conflicts does a player with multiple role expectations experience? (McCall, 1969)

An attempt was made to answer the above questions in relation to hockey "roles" and "counter roles".

The study was also concerned with how players apprehend what their actual behavior in a "role" should be, and how they adjust and readjust their behavior to the expectations and "counter

roles" of others when the standards of acceptable role behavior are nebulous. An attempt was made to analyze the effect of mass media and spectators had on player's roles. An important question was whether "roles" would change as a result of mass media and spectator influence, or in spite of it.

In summary the analysis of data in this phase consisted of distinguishing (1) the various roles both violent and otherwise, available to the player; (2) the significant difference between violent-orientated roles; and (3) whether or not violence is instinctual or socially learned behavior.

IV. UNFOCUSED INTERVIEW

The third phase of research was the unfocused interview. In order to more completely investigate the behavioral patterns and socialization process of the players, the researcher designed a unstructured interview. Here, pertinent existential information was obtained which was not available through observation. Since the study was concerned with the various roles occupied by the players, interviewing players provided a closer insight into the dynamics involved within each role.

Sample Selected

The subjects interviewed were chosen from two basic groups of male hockey players, members of the pre-professional and professional levels of hockey. The sample also included coaches and executive administrators from the two levels. The first group was comprised of junior players whose ages ranged from

seventeen to twenty years of age. These players represented the top level of junior hockey in North America (OHA Junior "A" and WCHL). Approximately fifteen players were interviewed encompassing eight teams from the two leagues. The second group was comprised of professional players whose ages ranged from twenty years and older (adults). These players represented the top level of professional hockey in North America (NHL and WHA). Approximately twenty-five players were interviewed with emphasis put on the WHA, although many of the players interviewed had recently played in the NHL. The sample encompassed ten teams from both leagues. It was felt that the players interviewed represented satisfactorily the hockey population under study and hence the data collected enabled the researcher to typify the hockey subculture.

Instrument

In order to facilitate informant cooperation and discussion the interviews were unstructured. No rigid questionnaire or interview schedule was used. The purpose of the interview was to augment observation and documentary data. However, the researcher asked open-ended key questions in order to set up a framework from which to work. The researcher did not follow a strict pattern or order during the interview, although all the questions were covered during the course of the interview. Due to the setting and informality of the interview, the questions were not asked verbatim. The following is a sample of the questions used:

1. What do you consider violent acts in hockey games, and what are the most serious?
2. What do you think causes violence in hockey? Example, is it fighting, use of the stick, etc.?
3. Is there more violence in professional hockey than junior hockey or vice versa? Explain.
4. What are the various roles available in hockey? Example, policeman, goon, hatchet-man, etc.? (Both violent and otherwise).
5. Do these roles change? Can they be readjusted or dropped?
6. What are the various characteristics of each role?
7. What is the process whereby players enter the roles?
8. What influencing factors play a part in shaping the roles? Example, coach, spectators, and media?
9. Do you think players like their roles all the time and how might they get out of them? How are they received afterwards?
10. Do you think violence in hockey is instinctual (innate) or socially learned (acquired) behavior? Could it have both qualities?
11. Do you think violence has increased in hockey over the past decade? Has the emphasis shifted towards the rough tough hockey player? Explain.
12. Do we need policemen, goons, etc.? How do you think we could remedy the problem, if in fact there is one?
13. Do you believe the hockey structure is satisfactory the way it is now? Do you believe it will change?
14. If there is a problem with violence in hockey, where do we start to solve the problem - in the professional ranks or at the minor level?

Procedure of Interview

The nature of the interview was unfocused and unstructured. The interviews were conducted throughout the two year duration

of the study and were scheduled wherever the opportunity arose for a cooperative discussion. The largest sample of subjects were interviewed during the hockey season (September to May) with the remainder being interviewed during the "off season" (May to August). Subjects were chosen who were available and most accessible to the researcher at the time and no distinct preference was made in selection, although an attempt was made to include subjects who were considered aggressive and had an inclination towards violent behavior (players considered "policemen", "goons", etc. by their peers). Since the researcher was an active participant many of the interviews took place when the situation presented itself, that is, potential subjects constantly came into contact with researcher at various places throughout the study. The interviews took place in bars (taverns), dressing rooms, airports, airplanes, etc. In very few cases were there predetermined locations and times established prior to the interview.

The length of the interviews was unpredictable, but usually ranged from approximately one to two hours during which all the necessary data was collected. When conversing with the subjects, there was never any tension or a feeling of uneasiness, in fact, many of the subjects were unaware of the underlying purpose of the interview. The method of presentation was structured in such a way that the subjects did not appear to become suspicious. Tape recorder and/or note-taking techniques were not used during the actual interview, and the setting was very informal and

natural. The proceedings of the interview were transformed into written form immediately following the interview.

The analysis of data collected in this phase of research consisted of determining: (1) what the active players believe violence is in the game, (2) how they perceive the various "roles" in hockey, (3) the consistency of the unofficial hierarchical structure among players, and (4) the correspondence between the responses obtained from other players and those obtained from the researcher's personal observation.

V. DELIMITATIONS AND LIMITATIONS

1. The study was limited to an accessible sample of pre-professional and professional North American hockey players, whose ages ranged from seventeen to approximately thirty-six.
2. The study is also limited to violence and aggression on the ice or thereabouts. The study is not concerned with spectator violence per se. That is, spectator outbursts, riots during and after the game, and various other forms of violence and overt aggressiveness associated with the crowd. Of major concern was the influence that spectators and fans have on begetting violence on the ice.

CHAPTER IV

THE HOCKEY SCENE

This chapter has been divided into two sections; the first deals with the formal organization of North American hockey which discusses the various levels ranging from minor hockey to that of major professional hockey. The second section deals with the professional hockey scene from the standpoint of role sets and role relations. This latter section will focus mainly on the major professional level of the social structure.

I. FORMAL ORGANIZATION OF HOCKEY

The formal organization of the North American hockey culture is divided basically into two levels - amateur and professional. The first encompasses minor, junior, college and senior hockey which comes under the jurisdiction of the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association (CAHA). The second encompasses semi-professional, minor professional and major professional hockey which come under the jurisdiction of their respective governors and directors.

Minor Hockey

The minor hockey structure comprises the largest portion of the subculture. This milieu of hockey is divided into age groups. Many boys start playing competitive hockey at the Tyke level (8-9) and progress through Pee Wee (10-12), Bantam (13-14), Midget (15-16) and Juvenile (17-18). Within each group there are usually two levels, one directed at the recreational level, the second

directed at the competitive level. The reason for this division was that the executive directors of minor hockey felt there should be a brand of hockey which caters to both philosophies of participation, the (1) recreational and fitness oriented programs which cater to boys enjoyment of the game, and (2) the competitive oriented programs for youngsters with exceptional ability and an interest in competing in more highly structured league play. The trend in North American hockey appears to be one in which the rate of participation at the minor level decreases as the various degrees of competition increase (Downey Report, 1973), with maximum participation at the Pee Wee level. Traditionally, the minor hockey programs are organized for and give preferential treatment to the competitive levels.

Although the general structure of minor hockey is consistent throughout North America as far as age and ability categories, the design and format does alter somewhat within each province and/or state. The rules and regulations, in regards to the game itself, follow those presented by the CAHA, with some variations included. For example, suspensions with regard to fighting may differ from province to province and even within leagues. This also might apply to the severity of penalties for such infractions as slashing, spearing, high-sticking or the intent to injure. There does not appear, at the present time, to be any consistency governing penalties and suspensions in the minor hockey structure. Further discussion of the above matter will be reviewed in Chapter VI.

When one talks of minor amateur hockey the controversy of junior hockey always arises - whether to include this level with professional or let it remain in the amateur sphere within the minor hockey structure. The present researcher believes that junior hockey should be classified as "pre-professional", and shall be referred to as such in this study.

Pre-professional Hockey

The junior hockey level in North America is said to be the prime "breeding grounds" for professional hockey clubs. This level is made up of talented 16 to 19 year olds. Within this level there are three distinct groups - major junior A (Tier One), junior A (Tier Two) and junior B. Although everyone playing junior hockey in their graduating year (19 years old) is eligible to be drafted by professional clubs, very few junior A (Tier Two) and junior B players progress to the professional level. The big business end of junior hockey lies within the major junior A leagues, where players must sign contracts and are paid a salary (living expenses and incidentals). When interviewing players in the major junior leagues in Canada, every player indicated his desire to continue on to professional hockey and make it a career. They felt, that because of expansion in professional hockey, the chances to turn professional have increased greatly in the last seven years. There appears to be more incentive to play major junior A hockey than there was a decade ago.

Prior to 1967 the professional clubs (NHL) sponsored amateur clubs and could virtually predetermine the hockey career of every

boy over 14 years of age. During this period boys were "scouted" and placed on affiliated teams which the professional teams sponsored. In 1967, along with NHL expansion, the universal drafting of players 20 years of age was formulated. In the draft, all hockey players 20 years of age (mostly graduating major junior league players) are eligible to be drafted by NHL teams in order of their finish in league standings from the previous year. This age was later reduced to include talented 18 year olds in 1974 when the WHA started to "raid" underage juniors.

Also included in the pre-professional category are college and senior hockey players, although the percentage which eventually turn professional has been very low. The motivating forces for college and senior players are, in many cases, completely different than those of junior players. At the college level education is the primary goal and hockey is secondary, which is opposite to the junior hockey players. Senior hockey in North America is not considered professional and very few players at this level have the interest or inclination to turn professional. Although often highly competitive, the primary reason for participation is recreational in nature. This level of hockey is comprised of talented junior and college players who do not wish to or lack sufficient talent to play professional hockey. The structure of college and senior hockey is not professionally oriented, as it is in the case of junior hockey. In junior hockey, everything is orientated to the professional model. Junior players are continually preparing themselves for professional careers

in hockey, even though many will ultimately not succeed in this ambition. If junior hockey in Canada is not professional in name and official standards, it is certainly professional in its organizational structure. In a brief submitted by the CAHA to the federal government, it is noted:

It is imperative to acknowledge that the CAHA recognize the fact that Major Junior A (Tier One) is professional hockey, and that it be divorced from continuing identification as amateur hockey (CAHA, October, 1973:5).

Junior Hockey in Canada is one of the major problems of the CAHA (Task Force, January, 1971). The attention of hockey officials, especially in the CAHA is centered at the junior level and above (Task Force, January, 1971). A cursory examination of junior hockey in Canada would indicate why so much attention has been directed to this most controversial but appealing segment of hockey. The CAHA needs to separate junior hockey from the current structure and legislate it with a new set of controls.

Junior hockey caters to professional standards. It would seem evident that the primary interest among junior hockey franchises is to develop players for professional teams. Professional hockey in North America dictates the standards set for junior hockey. In recent times (past 5 years) professional hockey (NHL, WHA) has indirectly indicated that they want a special "brand" or type of hockey player, specifically the tough aggressive player who can "handle himself". Junior hockey players' realize that a lucrative career is waiting for them at the professional level and will emulate the style sought after by professional "scouts". It has been suggested by researchers that the sociali-

zation process of professional players begin at a very young age (minor hockey) (Smith, 1974; McPherson, 1974; Botterill, 1972). This, in fact, is true, but the period where it appears that the most significant socialization occurs in hockey, is at the junior age level (17-20) (Smith, 1972; Vaz, 1972; Chynoweth, 1974; McMurtry, 1974). At this stage of the players career he is fully aware of the materialistic rewards available to him and often behaves accordingly. The processes whereby players' are socialized into behavioral patterns seem to have their greatest influence during this stage of the players' career. The attitudes and behavior of the junior hockey player appear to parallel the actions which are often dominant in professional hockey. In short, the structure of junior hockey is designed to produce professionals, and the most realistic method to accomplish this is to operate in a manner similar to the professionals. It becomes apparent that the objectives and philosophies of junior hockey are not similar to those generated in the minor hockey structure.

Below is a schematic diagram of the organization and progression of amateur hockey players.

Semi-professional Hockey

Until 1972 when the fledgling World Hockey Association was formed, the semi-professional level was basically divided into two categories; the first, known as minor professional, was a direct development league for major professional teams, and the




Figure 1.

PROGRESSION AND ORGANIZATION OF
AMATEUR HOCKEY

second, was semi-professional which comprised development leagues for the minor professional level. Prior to 1972 the former category was classified semi-professional and the latter was classified amateur. Now with the WHA in existence, the amateur league has turned professional although it is still ranked below the minor professional level in ability and salary scale. The minor professional category includes the American Hockey League (AHL), the Central Hockey League (CHL) and, until 1974 included, the Western Hockey League (WHL) which has now amalgamated with the CHL. The semi-professional category includes the International Hockey League (IHL), the North American Hockey League (NAHL), and the Southern Hockey League (SHL).

Prior to 1972 the NAHL and SHL were known as the Eastern Amateur Hockey League (EAHL) and league members were designated as development teams for the AHL, CHL and WHL. During this time the league did not employ a full-time commissioner and violent behavior was most prominent. The league, in fact, was commonly referred to as the "hatchet league". The welfare of the players ranked second to pugnacity and violence. Generally the players were not as talented and required the use of crude tactics to play in the league. The absence of a full-time commissioner and executive directors who might control such actions, was one of the reasons for the predominance of violence. There did not appear to be any concern for the well being of the players or the league, it was considered by many as "bush league" from its inception and the professional teams (NHL, CHL, AHL and WHL) did not benefit

greatly from the league as a potential source of player recruitment. It was always felt that if the professionals showed a concern for the league, the situation could have possibly been changed for the better. This became evident in 1972 when the WHA utilized the league as a direct "development league". The organizational structure consequently changed, and a full-time commissioner was employed to control and "clean-up" the league. Since the WHA had an interest in the league through affiliated teams, it was important to them that any previous stigma associated with the league be removed - making it respectable. By providing the league with talented hockey players it has henceforth become somewhat respectable. The violence once prevalent in this league has now been reduced through supervision by the major professional leagues, especially the WHA.

The minor professional leagues (AHL and CHL) are the direct "farm teams" of the NHL, with the exception of one team. Every team in this category has an affiliation with the NHL and abides by the rules and regulations established by the NHL. On the average the salaries and talent in the minor professional leagues exceed those found in the semi-professional leagues. The behavioral patterns of minor professionals parallel those of major professionals. All players in this league are striving to become a part of the major professional leagues. The leagues are largely staffed with graduating juniors who are not yet talented enough to play in the major professional leagues. These teams are generally young and "robust". Players are continually attempting to impress major league "scouts" in order to get a

chance with the parent NHL team.

Major Professional Hockey

Major professional hockey is the top echelon of hockey in North America. Until 1972, the NHL was the only major professional league, but it is now rivalled by the WHA. The two leagues have extensive influence and power in professional hockey, as depicted by the diagram below (Botterill, 1972).

The National Hockey League, and more recently the World Hockey Association, indirectly influence the legislation of the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association, and have created a feeder system oriented towards their kind of product and resources (Botterill, 1972). Botterill, in his analysis of amateur hockey in Canada, suggests:

The NHL has established such control over the CAHA and Hockey Canada that the government of Canada presently has very little influence in determining the style of hockey promoted at minor and amateur levels...The fact that the NHL monopoly on hockey is currently being threatened by a new major league (WHA) may eventually bring about some changes in this situation (Botterill, 1972:35).

A major portion of the CAHA and indirectly the pre-professional financial budget comes from monies paid by the NHL and WHA for junior players drafted. In 1974 the CAHA received approximately seven hundred thousand dollars from the junior draft, a substantial portion of their budget. Although the CAHA does not receive all the monies, much of it is returned to the development teams. This alone may justify to some extent the controlling interest the NHL and WHA has over the CAHA. Much of the contro-




Figure 2.

LINES OF EXTENSIVE INFLUENCE AND POWER
OF PROFESSIONAL HOCKEY

versy which arises between the CAHA and NHL (and WHA) results from a power struggle between the two bodies. There appears to be conflicting interests among the priorities set forth by each organization. The major professional leagues are solely interested in the development of potential hockey players for their system, whereas the CAHA must answer to the total amateur program in Canada and cannot cater to any one level of hockey. Since the CAHA needs the NHL and WHA for financial support, it must meet the demands of the professionals. An independent Task Force committee in 1971 recommended that the Federal Government assists with the administration of the CAHA. It also stated that there be "a complete independence from professional influence of all amateur hockey in Canada" (Task Force, 1971). Under the present hockey structure in Canada this might not appear to be practical, but with a restructuring of the CAHA, especially at the junior level, it does warrant review. The Task Force also indicated that:

The demands of the major professional leagues... have gone far to destroy the network of local and regional amateur hockey leagues that once contributed so colourfully to the richness of Canadian sport (Task Force, 1971:15).

Until 1972 the National Hockey League had complete control of professional hockey in North America. There was no rival league which the NHL had to compete with for players, and they had relatively few problems in the administration and organizational structure of the league. The NHL had autonomy of the hockey hierarchy, at both the amateur and professional levels. This dominance by the NHL was interrupted with the emergence of the World Hockey Association (1972). Now players could choose between

the two leagues, pending contractual commitments. The NHL was now presented with problems which the National Football League suffered in the mid 1960's with the formation of the American Football League. The fact that the major hockey leagues are separate has in many respects changed the future of the hockey structure. Major league teams numbering six in 1967, now total 32 in 1974 with more expansion to follow. Although this has provided a greater opportunity for individual players to reach major league status, it has "watered down" the calibre of hockey considerably. The brand of hockey now seen in North America, in many instances, is of the non-entertaining variety, especially in accordance with currently inflated ticket prices. Major league hockey owners have been faced with the difficult task of selling hockey to the public, while the game itself, because of the "watering down" effect of expansion has lost some of its original spectator appeal. Traditionally, it has been found that when talent decreases, as in the case of the "watered down" major professional leagues, the quality of play decreases. This in turn often increases the potential for violent behavior. Verification of this trend is evident at all progressional levels of hockey. This type of behavior appears to be a compensating factor for the less talented players.

Perhaps in the near future we will see the NHL and WHA amalgamate into one major hockey league. The two leagues operating as they are today, do not appear economically feasible.

Whether this will have any drastic effects on the hockey scene is questionable, and one can only speculate. Since the organizational structure of the hockey scene has been disrupted by the recent formation of the WHA, it is necessary to diagrammatically outline the existing structure of the hockey scene after 1972. and the structure which existed prior to 1972.

II. THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE PROFESSIONAL HOCKEY SCENE

Overview of Role Sets, Roles and Counter Roles

The purpose of this section is to overview the social structure of professional hockey as it pertains to "role sets", "roles", and "counter roles". As in all other walks of life, hockey is greatly influenced by human interaction between individuals. This interaction can occur between two groups (teams) or between two or more individuals. Interactions which this study was concerned with were: players and teammates; opponents on the ice; players and coaches; players and officials (referees); players and the media; and, players and spectators. These interactions could be physical (e.g., bodycheck, punch), symbolic (e.g., gestures) or verbal. While many of the possible interactions cited above are socially acceptable (e.g., coach-player, player-teammate); many are not (e.g., player-official, player-opponent) because of the rules inherent within the sport (McPherson, 1974).




Figure 3.

HOCKEY STRUCTURE PRIOR TO 1972




Figure 4.

HOCKEY STRUCTURE POST 1972


Whenever an individual (player) engages in interaction, he does so by playing what are known as "roles". The individual's role enactment occurs largely through a cycle of social situations with "counterroles", that is, relevant audiences, as indicated above. This study was concerned with various counter roles associated with the hockey subculture, those being; coach, teammates, media, spectators, officials, opponents, manager-owners, and professional "scouts". With the increasing atmosphere of violent behavior in hockey today, the interaction of roles at the professional level has become very significant, particularly the violent "roles". The roles which were focused on in this study are; "policeman", "goon", "intimidator", "antagonizer", "stickman" or "hatchetman".

Within the "roles" the individual exhibits a pattern of behavior and a set of qualities that are considered to be appropriate to that particular position in the hockey subculture. Each of the roles has an unique pattern of behavior associated with it and thus players behave differently when playing each role. The behavioral pattern appropriate to each role is determined by expectations, obligations and responsibilities that come to be associated with each role (Goffman, 1961; McPherson, 1974). The players' behavioral pattern is influenced to some extent by their own expectations, and those of others (counter roles). Some of the behavior is restricted by official and unofficial rules of the game. There is, however, a great deal of behavior, expectations and interaction that are not well-defined, and there can

be a wide interpretation by players and others as to how they (players) should behave when playing the various "roles". As a result, "roles" are played in many ways and violent unacceptable behavior may occur. Figure 5 illustrates the various "role sets" functional in professional hockey. The model also specifies which interactions may become sources of unacceptable violent behavior.

Research by psychologists and sociologists has demonstrated that social roles are acquired and learned through a process of socialization. By means of this process the individual acquires the motor skills, the social skills, the attitudes, the values, and the emotions that enable them to function within the sport milieu, and in this case, the hockey milieu. This process whereby sport roles (particularly aggressive-violent oriented) are acquired will be discussed in detail in Chapter V. Before the study reviews the socialization process and characteristics of the "roles", a brief overview of the entire structure, as it exists in professional hockey, is necessary. Figure 6 illustrates the various "counter roles" which exist in the total structure, and the stratification of the professional levels. The model also indicates the internal and external relationships, and degree of significance that the "counter roles" have on the influencing "roles".

When dealing with aggressive and violent behavior, there are basically five unofficial "roles" which players can occupy. Although some of the characteristics overlap, there is a basic distinction between roles. The following is a brief description of



----- Potentially Violent Role Interaction

———— Non-Violent Role Interaction

Figure 5.

ROLE INTERACTION IN PROFESSIONAL HOCKEY

		Internal Relationships		External Relationships	
		Least Significant	Most Significant	Most Significant	Least Significant
Major Professional	Non-Playing Peers	Team-mates	Player	Official	Spectator
		General Manager	Coach	Opponents	Pro Scout
Minor and Semi Professional	Non-Playing Peers	Team-mates	Player	Official	Spectator
		General Manager	Coach	Opponent	Pro Scout
Pre-Professional	Parents	Team-mates		Official	Media
		General Manager	Coach		Opponents
		Peers (non-playing)	Player	Pro Scout	Spectator

SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF PROFESSIONAL HOCKEY

Figure 6.

the roles which will be referred to throughout the thesis.

1. Policeman - refers to players who are unofficially designated to control the "rough-going" in the hockey game. Opponents who "get out of hand" must answer to the "policeman". The chief duties of the policeman are "protection" and "enforcement" for his teammates. The primary physical attributes of the "policeman" are his "toughness" and the ability to "handle himself", particularly in "fights". Generally, "policemen" have a regular position on the team.
2. Goons - refers to players whose forte is "fighting" and the infliction of violence upon their opponents. Many of the characteristics are similar to that of the policemen, although his hockey ability is less refined - talent wise. Their presence on the hockey team is usually strictly for "muscle", also referred to as "heavies". The "goons" do not generally have a regular position on the team and are used usually when the action on the ice gets "out of hand" or one of his teammates is getting "bullied".
3. Intimidators - refers to players who use "bully-like" tactics to influence the play of their opponents. The intimidator may use verbal or physical threats to intimidate his opponent. He is usually very adept

in the act of "fisticuffs" and can usually back up his threats. The intimidator may resort to violence if necessary. Again, the intimidator possesses the characteristics of the "policeman" and "goon", although his primary function is to intimidate the opponents.

4. Antagonizers - refers to players who frustrate and aggravate their opponents. Physical "prowess" and "toughness" are not necessary to the antagonist. They generally do not engage in "fighting" or such behavior, although such action may result. The function of this type of player is to goad their opponents into retaliating and thus have the opponent take unnecessary penalties or disrupt his style of play. The antagonist usually requires the services of a "policeman" or "goon" when the situation "gets out of hand". Often referred to as a "shit disturber".

5. Stickmen or Hatchetmen - refers to players who constantly use their hockey stick as a weapon. Tactics such as "spearing", "slashing" and "butt-ending" are their trade-mark. Generally, they are not physically equipped in body stature to "handle" themselves in "fisticuffs". This type of player is usually very dirty and mean, and is not highly respected by his colleagues (opposition). They very seldom fight, and never drop their stick; it is their "equalizer".

The above descriptions offer the basic characteristics of the "roles". More detail will be provided on these roles in Chapter V, along with the socialization process.

Role Relationships

As previously mentioned, once the players have acquired their designated roles certain expectations and obligations are perceived by the counter roles. How the roles are perceived depends upon internal and external relationships. The internal relationships (Figure 6) involve close associations between the actor and counter roles, such as team members and staff. Also included would be close friends who the actor associates with outside of the team (non-playing peers). The external relationships are with those who the actor becomes indirectly involved with and have some influence in the shaping of roles, generally counter roles outside the team as indicated in Figure 6. Within the social structure, each of the counter roles have a significant degree of influence in the socialization process of role enactment. Figure 6 illustrates which counter roles are most significant, and those which are least significant.

It has been found that the most influence on the player's behavior are those of internal relationships. The unconscious shaping of roles will receive its greatest impetus from teammates, coaches and general managers when they project their bias toward a certain role. Although not as significant as the internal relationships, external role relationships do

affect the behavior of the actor, especially at the pre-professional level. For example, the influence of professional "scouts" on juniors is great because of a major concern to the players potential future as a professional hockey player. The media is also highly regarded at this level, in that, wide coverage may attract the attention of "scouts", consequently they come out to observe the player who is attracting the "press". Again, the total structure of external counter roles is illustrated in Figure 6.

In summary, the chapter reviewed the formal organization of amateur and professional hockey in relation to the various levels and classifications. The four distinct levels were minor, pre-professional, semi-professional, and major professional. The controlling body of amateur hockey is the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association, along with its provincial governing associations, and the controlling body of professional hockey is the National Hockey League and the World Hockey Association. It is evident that the objectives and philosophies of professional hockey all converge to those dictated by these two bodies.

The chapter also reviewed the social structure of professional hockey as it exists today. Since the study utilized the role analysis method in its description of professional hockey, an overview of the roles and counter roles was presented. A brief discussion of the role sets and the relationships between roles introduced the process whereby players acquire violent roles. Role relationships were divided into

two categories; internal and external, and both were significant in the shaping and maintaining of roles. The intention of the chapter was to present a broad picture of the hockey scene and how the roles and counter roles fit together. The forthcoming chapter will be focused on the socialization process of the professional hockey player toward violent-oriented roles, and a comprehensive study of each role.

CHAPTER V
THE VIOLENT ROLES IN THE PROFESSIONAL
HOCKEY SCENE

In recent years the role of the violent prone competitive hockey player has become more predominant. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the unofficial roles which have influenced violent and aggressive behavior in pre-professional and professional hockey. The author will define and discuss in some detail the characteristics and interactions of the violent-oriented roles which were introduced in the previous chapter. The chapter will also attempt to explain the socialization processes whereby the roles are acquired and maintained, and the role conflicts which occur between the various roles and counter roles.

I. THE VIOLENT ROLES

Violence has always been a part of hockey and the roles displayed by the players are not new. Since the cry for blood and violence has become louder, emphasis on the violent role portrayal has increased. The general opinion of the hockey crowd is that "violence is a part of the game", and the list of violent actions excludes few players (Weiler, 1973). It is not certain why this aspect of the game has increased, but there has been general concern that a major influence has been spectator demand. In order to function and operate efficiently, professional hockey caters to the masses.

When the author introduced the various rôles in Chapter IV, distinct labels or names were attached to each. These unofficial labels or names have been given to the players either by the peers, spectators or players themselves, and carry with them a connotation of violence that become attached to the players that are so described. The importance of this type of player to their respective teams has often drawn rave reviews from the attendant press corps or team publicists.

Prior to the early 1960's, these specialists, if we may call them that, were generally considered a rare commodity in the hockey world. In fact, some teams did not employ such players, suggesting that skill and finesse could win over brawn and muscle. Until recently this in fact had some merit. Let us turn to the various roles in question.

The Policeman

The "policeman", as the term implies, is the "enforcer" or "protector". It is the job of the "policemen" to protect their teammates. The chief characteristics of the "policeman" are his "toughness" and the ability to "handle himself". That is, they have built a reputation as being very "tough" physically and very adept at "fighting". These players are highly respected by opposition players for their "brutal" talents. Quite often these players will seldom have to "fight" because of the reputation they have developed. Not too many "policemen" have the reputation of losing fights, and the opposition are generally aware of this fact.

As the "enforcer" or "protector" it is the "policeman's" job

to look after teammates who are not responsible or often capable, physically, for this type of action. For example, the "goal scorers" and "playmakers" have distinct roles apart from that of a "muscleman". So that these "other" specialists may become effective in their designated roles, it is necessary to provide protection from the opposition. It is the trend in hockey to attempt to contain or control the "goal scorers" and "playmakers" by "out muscling" them. It has become the job of the "policeman" to counteract this tactic, either directly or indirectly. The direct method would be to engage in "fisticuffs" or "step in" when the occasion called for such action. The indirect method would have the "policeman" continually "hitting" the opposition, consequently the opposition would be watching out for the "policeman", thus attracting the attention away from his teammates. This is one reason why teams attempt to have four or five "policemen" on the team. This enables them to have at least one "policeman" on the ice at all times. This is why "policemen" have a regular position on the team. The "policemen" generally possess the required talents which warrant a regular shift, and are not expected to score many goals.

The Goon

Many followers of the game feel that the role of "policeman" is synonymous to that of a "goon". Although often refuted among the hockey followers, there is a distinction between the two roles. The role of "goon" is somewhat more physical and has a lower status than that of a "policeman". The sole forte of a "goon" is "fighting"

and the infliction of violence. His hockey talents per se are less refined and his presence on the hockey team is strictly for "muscle". The title of "goon" is usually restricted to the locker room primarily because of its intellectual connotations. The interpretation is often misleading among hockey fans, therefore, players of this status are sensitive regarding the mention of this term in public. No player wants to be labelled a "goon", even though he might possess all the necessary characteristics. There appears to be a "distasteful" stigma attached to the title of "goon". Players feel that to be labelled a "goon" is down-grading to their self-image and personal pride. In contrast to the role of "policeman", no player openly admits to being a "goon", even if the mass majority of opposition and media acknowledge this fact.

The "goon" does not take a regular shift and is used only sparingly, usually when the action on the ice "gets out of hand" or to "settle a score" with an opposing player. The "goon" does not rate with the "policeman" as far as talent is concerned. When the "goons" become more adept at their hockey skills they are unofficially promoted to the role of "policemen". The main difference between the "goon" and "policeman" is the degree of talent. The "policeman" contributes more to the team than the "goon" because he is more versatile, ability-wise. The team only employs one, and possibly two "goons" during the season, due to the fact that it is not economically feasible to have too many "non-regulars", especially with the high salaries being paid to professionals today. It is more common to see "goons" in the pre-professional level

since high salaries are non-existent. Also, this level has a wider discrepancy in player talent, thus there are more opportunities for "goons" to be functional. The "goon" may also be referred to as a "hit-man", a self-explanatory term.

The Intimidator

Webster's dictionary defines intimidation as, "the use of threats or violence to influence the actions of another; the condition of being frightened by threats."

This definition is somewhat of an overstatement when referring to intimidation in hockey, although influence of the actions of another certainly occurs. Athletes at the professional level seldom become "frightened" or "afraid", but it is true that their actions can be influenced by threats of violent behavior. If during the course of the hockey game a player is being intimidated by an opposing player, his style of play is often unquestionably altered, either enhancing his play or detracting from it. Obviously the objective of the opposition is to attempt to cause a deterioration of performance.

Physical intimidation has always been present in hockey, primarily because it is a physical body contact sport. Historically, some forms of intimidation have always played a major role in the final outcome of games. From very minute forms of figurative intimidation to grotesque threats of violence, intimidating tactics have had some influence in game results. Since the "intimidators" usually possess the physical characteristics of the "policemen" or "goon", support has been given that "fighting" has been recognized

as the chief manifestation of intimidation. The ultimate goal of the "intimidator" is to provide attack, whereby the opposing player is "lured" into a fight or some form of retaliation, and in doing so is penalized. Many "intimidators" utilize this strategy to eliminate talented players from the game. This often puts the opposition at a distinct disadvantage.

Through controlled and deliberate use of physical intimidation the skillful "intimidators" strive to remain within the legal boundaries of the present rule structure. This is an excellent example of "rule-governed" violence which has become evident in professional hockey. Presently, the rules are designed and enforced so that the "intimidator" is put in an advantageous position. There will be more light shed on the effect of intimidation and its relation to violent roles later in the thesis.

The Antagonizer

Intimidation does not necessarily always culminate in fighting or the use of "scare" tactics. Many players use more subtle, casual forms of intimidation which are not of the overpowering nature. Tactics such as jabbing, holding, interfering, and the occasional high stick are just a few in their repertoire. The objective of such players is to infuriate and/or frustrate their opponents enough to distract them from playing their normal game or take needless retaliating penalties.

Skilled "antagonizers" who have played professionally for a few years develop a sixth sense when choosing their victim. They

know who can be antagonized and who cannot, when to antagonize and where. The "antagonizer" knows that frustrating and arousing the wrong players to an increased tempo can sometimes prove disastrous. Having some players become infuriated or angry often inspires them to play harder, consequently creating a disadvantage for your team. That is, during the course of the professional hockey season (75 games or more) players with outstanding ability periodically play somewhat lethargically. Possibly they are tired, not inspired, and are not "psyched up" for a particular game. Established "antagonizers" are aware of this and usually leave them alone, hoping they will continue to play in their lethargic manner. Coaches will often instruct their players not to antagonize player "M" of the opposition - in other words, do not "wake him up". Some players require a solid "bodycheck" or violent behavior to "get into the game". Therefore, the "antagonizer" must be careful in his selection of opposition players.

A characteristic or what some might call a tendency that generally all "antagonizers" possess is the gift of the "tongue". Once the "antagonizer" has attracted the attention of an opposing player, he will start a "verbal battle" to incense retaliation. It should be noted that the "stream" of language is not usually of the complimentary variety. In short, the "antagonizer" attempts to "call down" his opponent by degrading verbal attacks. He tries to get his goad. Being called "yellow", "chicken shit" and so forth are but a few phrases which might aggravate or incense the opposition. Some players revert strictly to "word of mouth" when

it comes to antagonizing and never have any intentions of defending their accusations. Since this particular player rarely defends himself physically, he usually requires help from his teammates to lend support, which might come from the "policeman" or "goon". This type of "antagonizer" is very good at starting trouble but cannot finish it. Quite often teammates become disenchanted with this form of intimidation because the "antagonizer" seldom receives any physical punishment as a result of his initial attack. The general "rule of thumb" is that "if you cannot back up your intentions, do not get involved." Occasionally there are teams who have players willing to "back up" this type of "antagonizer", particularly if the "antagonizer" is a valuable member of the team, either as a "goal scorer" or "checker". The above form of antagonistic behavior could be classified as "figurative violence". In the unofficial hierarchy of violent roles, the verbal antagonist would rank very low on the scale, close to the "stickman" or "hatchetman".

o. The Stickman

The "stickman", sometimes referred to as the "hatchetman", are players who use their hockey stick as a weapon to inflict violence on their opponents. Players who utilize this brutal tactic of violence are possibly the most hated men in hockey. When discussing acts of violent behavior with players and executives of the professional and junior leagues, it was found that they felt the most serious were those involving the stick. For example,

"spearing", "slashing", "butt-ending", and "high-sticking" were considered the most serious. Any behavior whereby players can be seriously injured as a result of illegal use of the stick. Some of the most severe injuries in hockey have occurred as a result of "stick-wielding" incidents. One only has to be reminded of the Green-Maki incident (Frayne, 1974). As a result, the hockey careers of the two combatants were jeopardized severely; one through a fractured skull, and the other through the stigma attached to him in the aftermath.

Players are very reluctant to talk about the "stickman", but they all know who they are, and when playing against them become conscious of their whereabouts at all times. They like to catch opposing players "off guard" and especially when the referee has his back to them. The "stickman" is not usually physically overpowering and rarely drops his stick when confronted with the traditional procedure of "fisticuffs". He considers it his "equalizer" over "muscle". An example of this occurred recently in the major professional leagues.

During the course of the hockey game Player R and Player F were having their own personal feud with each other. At one point of the game "R" followed "F" into the end of the rink and deliberately, with his stick, raised above legal limits, "R" rammed into "F". Player "F" did not retaliate with his stick. But, promptly, dropped his gloves to the ice and indicated that he was quite prepared to settle this business with his bare fists. Player "R" wanted no part of fisticuffs. Keeping his stick in his hands, he made deliberate attempts to spear "F" in the face with the pointed blade of his stick.

It should be noted that Player "R" was the instigator of the entire case. The above case study typifies the role of the "stickman". This type of player is not generally tolerated among players and is often ostracized in a very short time. These players are usually of fairly low calibre from a skill standpoint and are usually found in semi-professional leagues. Players resorting to this type of behavior become "marked men" in the major leagues (NHL and WHA). Players do not wish to have their career ended by means of a stick.

II. SOCIALIZATION PROCESS IN PRE-PROFESSIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL HOCKEY

This section will deal mainly with the pre-professional and professional levels of North American hockey, although a brief discussion of minor age group hockey will be included. Within each level the study will review the induction and maintenance process of violent roles. This section will also attempt to explain the influence of counter roles on the "violent roles". Let us now turn to the process by which players assume the various roles.

Early Socialization Patterns in Hockey

The process of induction starts as early as 12 years of age. With the advent of television and other reinforcements, the young hockey player learns very quickly the sport "roles", both violent and otherwise, in hockey. During childhood and adolescence, the socialization process whereby sport roles are learned involves primarily observation and imitation of significant others (such as

parents, coaches, peers and significant role models). The most influential and most frequently imitated models are those who are highly successful, highly visible, and who appear to be in a prestigious position in the sport structure. It is during this stage that young hockey players become aware of the various roles available to them.

Classification of young players into categories is not practical because these youngsters are unaware of the ramifications involved. To classify a youngster, a "goon", "intimidator", "stickman" is somewhat unfair and unjust. Perhaps the process starts at an early age, but only in a very subtle form. An inclination to behave as so-called "policeman" at this early age usually results from being an "early maturer". Skilled athletes often will start their maturation process earlier than normal (M.F. Smith, 1974). For their age group they are often heavier, taller, and thus stronger. Since awkwardness and lack of coordination are a common trait during this period, boys must depend upon their size and strength to stand them in good stead with their peers. It is often at an early age that many players learn the advantages of their size and how it can best be used as an asset to their performance.

As previously mentioned, the process of induction usually starts at the midget age level. Here the competition is generally of higher calibre and the emphasis on winning increases greatly. Some parents and coaches start teaching the players subtle methods of physical coercion. The conditions and values of sportsmanship

and fair play are often overshadowed by the win-at-all costs syndrome. The major motivating factor in playing the game changes from affiliation to that of achievement. Webb (1969) found that as boys increase in age there was an increase in the importance placed on skill and success and a decrease in the importance placed in their play. As cited in the review of literature, many coaches and parents want their players and sons respectively to play an aggressive, violent style of hockey. The 15 and 16 year olds are now being introduced to the "finer" points of the game. Extensive research into the minor hockey social structure indicates that minor coaches do in fact promote and teach reactive aggressiveness, and subtle forms of violence, rather than controlled aggression which is an essential part of hockey, especially the checking aspect of the sport (M.D. Smith, 1972, 1974; Vaz, 1974; Vaz and Thomas, 1973). Within the past few years there have been countless newspaper articles, reports, etc. which attest to the fact that minor hockey is facing a problem with violence. It is not the purpose of this section to quote articles referring to this recurring problem, however the author would like to cite one incident which typifies the problem. During the past season a midget hockey coach remarked to his charges who were performing a relatively non-aggressive style of hockey, "C'mon guys, we're not out here for the good of our health, let's start playing the body... knock somebody down out there...we're playing like sissies." The author in observation felt that the youngsters were playing an enjoyable game. However, it becomes ironic when coaches intimate

to their players that hockey is not good for their health. It only becomes healthy when rough aggressive play is instilled in the game.

In summary, most sport roles are learned via imitation of others who already occupy the role. This imitation occurs within the family, the peer group, and the minor sport organization and is reinforced by significant others such as parents, coaches, siblings and peers.

Pre-professional Socialization

In our Canadian system the player at the age of seventeen is ready for induction into a subculture whose primary objective is to win, and indirectly to produce professionally bound hockey players. Recruits into this milieu undergo a socialization in which they receive ever increasing injunctions to acquire a repertoire of assaultive skills as "tools of the trade". If the player wants to continue in competitive hockey he now must conform to expectations put upon him by his coach, peers and often by parents. Not conforming to this standard will result in unpleasantness and possible withdrawal from the game, or at least from the major junior "A" level. One only has to attend a junior "A" hockey training camp to verify this fact.

By the time players reach junior hockey they have become totally familiar with the norm to be aggressive at all times. The degree to which a player becomes aggressive will constitute whether or not he possesses violent tendencies. Other factors such as

frustration, tolerance of hostility and anger, instinctual behavior of the individual, and previous learning experiences play a vital role in determining assaultive behavior. Many junior hockey players sometimes enter the game with a predisposition to aggressive behavior. The player has strong aggressive habits due to prior learning experiences. Players will frequently have a history of violent behavior as a small child, and throughout their childhood there may have been a continual approval of aggressive behavior. Since the player has a natural history of overt aggression it would be safe to assume that his actions on the ice may be aggression-oriented.

Socialization into "roles" involves positive and negative reinforcement from significant "others". At the junior level the significant "others" are the coach, teammates, peers and parents. Vaz (1972) noted that physical aggression, especially fighting, is normative, institutionalized behavior learned via socialization, and is part of the role expectations of the player. As a result, under certain conditions the failure to fight or retaliate is negatively rewarded by the significant "others". If during the game an aggressive player by chance becomes involved in a fight and subsequently is the victor, he is usually rewarded by his coach and teammates. Having won the fight the player has gained some individual confidence and a taste of victory which could very likely enhance his motivation to fight again. Since the player was rewarded for his endeavours, the readiness to

fight when confronted in the same manner is heightened. In a matter of time the player's aggressive impulses are triggered more readily, and more situations are seen as calling for assaultive responses. The player continually being the victor in fights has gained a measure of respect from his fellow teammates as well as a degree of cognitive support from the spectators. Once the player has shown he can "handle himself" in the fights, his teammates now expect him to fight whenever the opportunity arises. The player now has peer pressure to engage in fights or in effect, to become the "policeman" or "goon". It should be noted that the above process does not only pertain to fighting but also to other forms of assaultive behavior.

Much of junior hockey seems to have become a "breeding ground" of assaultive behavior. Fighting in junior hockey appears to be the most instrumental form of assaultive behavior used. Players entering this level of the game feel that fighting is vital to ensuring advancement to professional careers. Ninety per cent of the players are playing solely for draft purposes, and must impress the professional "scouts". The junior players are well aware of the qualities and criteria which "scouts" vie to select potential prospects. Being "tough" has a great influence on what professional team drafts a player and how high he goes in the annual selection of over-age juniors.

The thinking of junior hockey players is portrayed in the professional "scouts" evaluation report. It appears that currently of primary concern to the "scout" is "how big is the player",

"is he tough", how many minutes in penalties does he have, can he "handle himself" in the "rough going", and is he aggressive and "mean". After reviewing these credentials the "scout" will then turn to passing, puck handling and goal scoring ability. The philosophy of most professional teams is that, it is much easier to instill and teach young players the latter, but very difficult to teach and find players with the former qualities. After reviewing a recent major professional draft list (Toronto Toros, May, 1974) the author thought the list resembled names from a boxing promoter's fight card. The top seven players were all over 190 pounds. When commenting to the general manager as to the irony of the "fight card", his reply was, "We want them big (referring to the juniors) and 'tough' next year...we'll teach them to skate and shoot." This would likely be a typical response of the majority of general managers currently in professional hockey. A coach of a recent Stanley Cup championship team was asked what factors he would cite as being most instrumental in their recent success. One of the factors mentioned was, "when other professional teams were drafting 'goal scorers' and the best juniors available, our team was drafting players with size and who were 'tough' (Toronto Star, May, 1974).

The transition of drafting big "tough" players instead of the best players available over the past few years has added a new dimension to the game. In discussing this matter with a highly talented junior, J.H., he felt that:

If you're being pushed around, you go late in the draft. Besides, it's a matter of personal pride... the pro 'scouts' expect you to have the ability to take care of yourself on the ice. If another is 'out-muscling' you haven't got a chance of impressing (J.H., 1973).

At a recent tournament of pre-professional hockey players, one of the coaches was approached by many "scouts". The chief concern of every "scout" was how "tough" were the players, could they "handle themselves".

Impressing the professional "scouts" is a major reason for assaultive behavior, but there are other reasons. J.H. feels that fighting is beneficial for team morale, he states:

If someone backs down from a fight it's not good for team morale. You look like a fool, the team looks foolish and then all the team spirit is shot. Sometimes if your teammates does a good job on another player it makes you feel good and want to play harder (J.H., 1973).

Another talented forward in major junior hockey looks at the brawls that infest league play as being part of the game, and preparation for playing professionally.

You have to play rough to be in the game. The sport is "tough"...this league (referring to major junior) especially so...so if you don't stand up for yourself; you're a goner. There's a lot of guys in the league who have hot tempers and short fuses and they'll fight over anything. Other guys can't control themselves and go crazy in rough games. Most of all, though, a good fight is enjoyable. There's nothing like swinging it out with a guy who's giving you trouble (A.W., 1973).

Many players believe that fighting and rough aggressive play is part of a team's image. D.J., forward with a major junior team, feels that his team won a lot of games because of "our

reputation as being tough and intimidating". The general consensus among the juniors, from the interviews, is that fighting and the use of casual violence, rather than jeopardizing their career, will enhance it. The juniors feel that there is never any negative sanctions placed upon them to stop using assaultive behavior. The majority of juniors feel that they are expected to fight as part of their role as a hockey player. The above quotes exemplify a large portion of the boys playing major junior hockey.

At the pre-professional level, the coach, plays a dominant role in the socialization process. Junior coaches realize that they must win plus provide hockey players for the professionals, because indirectly it is economically beneficial to his hockey team (in the way of draft money). The philosophy and attitudes of the coach is often reflected by his players. The junior coach is aware of what professional teams want in the way of future prospects. When discussing the merits of assaultive behavior and its affect on the junior player, with a coach of a major junior team, he emphatically commented:

I like big, 'rough', 'dirty' hockey players who are super aggressive. If the player can't handle himself, get out! A junior hockey player in his last year of eligibility has to have these qualities if he is going to make a professional career in hockey...the money nowadays is going to the 'tough', 'rough' players. Look at the 1974 draft; the big players all got drafted because of their size, not ability. The small finesse hockey players were shunted aside and went very low in the draft (Junior coach, 1974).

One of the prerequisites that a junior coach looks for is fighting ability among his players and it appears that all juniors sense this upon entering this level. Nowadays it is not uncommon to attend a Junior A training camp and witness numerous fights. The trainer of a competitive junior hockey team in a Canadian city reported to this author that upwards of a dozen fights would occur during one full day of training camp, in which players were vying for positions on the team. Players lacking the skilled talents per se will usually adopt a fighting attitude in order to make the team. Also during training camp, fights have been deliberately "set-up" as character tests. If a player in training camp has not shown promise as a "scorer", "play maker" or "checker", management (which includes the coach) will test the player as having any potential as a fighter or "policeman". In short, if you cannot make the team on talent alone, you had better be a good fighter.

It was brought to the author's attention by the juniors that some coaches have deliberately designated certain players (usually a "goon" or "policeman") to start a fight with an opposing player. In junior hockey the players are young and eager to please the coach, regardless of the logic behind his instructions. Not conforming to the coach's instructions could jeopardize the players' career, and indifferences between player and coach usually results in the player being "benched". The junior coach is extremely influential in a junior hockey players' career and the

players realize this fact, consequently they will obey and follow orders of the coach. Most of the juniors are afraid to question the coach's logic behind his actions. Since many of the junior coaches are former professional stars, the juniors appear at times to idolize their coach and feel they must be right in all their decisions.

Often junior coaches instigate drills to find out how "tough" players are or, in some cases, to teach and develop a "rough" aggressive style of play. An appropriate label for these drills might be called "courage drills". They are also utilized as a method for eliminating the "undesirables". That is, it detects players who do not have the desire or "character" to play a "tough" physical game. Hopefully, these "drills" will "weed out" any players who cannot withstand or "handle" the style of play condoned in major junior hockey. After participating in a few "courage drills", many players "drop out" without being told or humiliated in front of their peers. Examples of "courage drills" would be; (1) players skating into the boards without stopping at three-quarters speed; (2) players skating into the corner for the puck with another player (usually a large defenseman) charging from behind to knock the first player in off the puck. This would be similar to a charging penalty; (3) two players put in a "face-off" circle without gloves and stick, and the objective is to see which player can physically overpower the other out of the circle, by any means, and (4)

having three players continually attempting to knock one player down, with and without the puck. It should be noted that these "drills" can be beneficial and useful if done properly. What often happens is that coaches manipulate the "drills" to their liking, thus the original purpose of the drills are distorted or lost. When done viciously they become "character tests" as previously described.

Often players at the junior level become socialized or inducted into the role of "policeman", "goon", or "intimidator" because of their large, mesomorphic body type. For this reason alone they are automatically expected to adopt the role of "enforcer", especially by their teammates. Players who weigh 200 pounds and are 6'2" in height find it extremely difficult to justify a passive-style of play. Rather than adopt the label of being "chicken" or "scared", the player conforms to peer expectations, as well as the coach's expectations. Since the number of highly skilled, talented players at this level are limited, the junior coach usually select large mesomorphic players to help compensate for their lack of talent. Now that some major professional teams have become successful by employing large "physical" players, the junior teams are doing the same. It appears that they are sacrificing speed and finesse for "muscle".

Also of great importance in the shaping of roles is the influence that peers, both playing and non-playing, have on player expectation. The significance of peer influence is far greater

in junior hockey than in professional hockey. M.D. Smith (1972) found that junior hockey players receive a great deal of approval for aggressive acts from their non-playing friends. Non-playing peers tend to give prestige to players on the basis of aggressive and violent behavior.

The significance of non-playing peers is not as evident as others because they are more isolated from observation, as they influence the private lives of the players. It would seem that both teammates and non-playing friends equate "toughness" and aggressive behavior with that of a prestigious position. More attention is given to players who adopt the "tough" violent role than to players who score goals, especially by the non-playing peers.

In North America our society dictates the behavior of young hockey players and is instrumental in the formation of violent roles. A substantial quantity of assaultive behavior and/or the induction of violent roles stem from what this author refers to as the "masculinity syndrome". Junior players look at violence as a "character contest", whereby one must "show themselves" (Faulkner, 1971). All players, naturally, want to be treated with respect and establish a positive identity. Fighting ability and "toughness" are an importance means of doing so.

If players do not retaliate aggressively themselves they feel that it is a reflection on their masculinity. The hockey fight serves as a kind of "masculinity rite" whereby young males can

enter into manhood (M.D. Smith, 1974). It is not practical in our present society to back down from a fight or turn your back on an "intimidator". Players who do so are quickly branded as "chicken" or stigmatized so that they quit the game competitively or until they show they can fight and handle the "rough going". Some observers feel that much of the heroics in junior hockey is a game of "bluff", and that some players adopt violent roles through this tactic. This strategy is harder to maintain as competition increases and players advance into the professional ranks. It is more common among the juniors and players with large mesomorphic body types as previously described.

When describing the socialization process at the pre-professional level, one cannot overlook the influential factors that spectators and the media have on violent behavior. Previous research indicates that spectators have the most significance at the pre-professional level, especially the minor level (M.D. Smith, 1971). This is understandable, because the majority of spectators are usually close friends or parents, whereas the majority of spectators at the professional level are there solely to be entertained and are not really concerned with the welfare of the player.

During the interviews with junior hockey players, most of them felt the use of violence (mainly physical assault) for fan appreciation did exist. The typical response was:

Most of them (fans) come to the games just to see somebody get killed...If the game is one-sided or very boring usually one of the players (very often the "policeman" or "goon") will start something,

usually in the way of a fight. We know the fans want it, so we give it to them.

Reliable data regarding the influence of spectators' on players' conduct is limited, but there is an element of credibility in the belief that some of the violence is a response to the demands of the onlookers (M.D. Smith, 1972). Spectators very often go home disappointed when they fail to witness a fight or "rough" game. Today junior hockey appears to be synonymous with "rough" play. There are junior hockey franchises which have strong reputations for being physical and "tough", and consequently they readily resort to assaultive behavior. One junior commented that, "he had played in the league for two years and never once was there a fight-free game in city "V". When asked to explain why, he replied, "...well they had a "rough" and big club, but I think it was because of the fans, -- they expected to see a fight and the players know it." One junior remarked, "...in some cities the fans cheer louder when someone fights or takes a punishing 'check', than they do for a goal." Personality factors (Bandura and Walters, 1973; M.D. Smith, 1974) also determine how much the players become affected by the spectators. Some players naturally become affected by crowds while others adopt "roles" irregardless of the spectators. Some felt that the mood, atmosphere and emotions of the spectators differ from city to city, thus affecting the degree of influence upon the players. It was generally agreed that the influence of spectators does have some effect on how players perform, and to some

extent on what "role" they have with the hockey team.

The power of the media is a most influencing method for establishing attitudes and norms (Wertham, 1969). Many feel that the media is responsible for the influx of violence in hockey and therefore the media should accept some responsibility for abolishing violence, or at least controlling it. The various media have fundamental differences in their manner of technical production and their distribution, but as far as violence content and its effects are concerned, they may be considered together. In hockey, the two most prominent means of media influence are television and newspaper reporting. During the winter months hockey can be observed at least twice a week, and this frequency increases during the play-offs. One junior hockey coach in Western Canada commented, "Since television has brought the NHL into Western Canada, we've become very well acquainted with fighting and burtality" (Coaching Association of Canada, Bulletin VI, June, 1974:6).

Junior players aspiring to play profesionally watch professionals on television, and attempt to emulate their behavior. Continually being rewarded and being considered as successful as the professionals are, the juniors often adopt the "roles" displayed at the professional level. Nowadays professional hockey is much more exposed to the public than it was a decade ago. Sociologically, the hockey culture presents to many a model figure to emulate and model methods to follow. With the expanded coverage of television many players are absorbing from the media the idealization of

violence. Not the association of violence with hostility, but that which is good and right, or that which has become an acceptable form of violence. This idealization works in two areas; the glamour of the violent act (assault in hockey) and the glorification of the player of ready violence ("policeman", "goon", etc.). Identification with a heroic figure (professional hockey star) is one of the prominent means of learning, and an intricate part of the socialization process whereby "sport roles" are learned. Recently television has been giving equal time to the "goal scorers" and "fighters". The role of the "policeman" and "intimidator" is being glamourized by television, and has started to affect the thinking of young hockey players (Coaching Association, June, 1974:6).

At the junior level the newspaper media seems to thrive on the reporting of violence, possibly because it is an effective attention-getting device. Apparently, violence in athletics is an easy way to arouse interest, win an audience, and hold it. When discussing the effect of the newspaper with juniors, they all read the articles on the team and themselves, and were concerned with the "press" whether good or bad. Some feel that the newspaper has the power to alter ones playing style or encourage existing styles. For example, when players continually read in the newspaper that they are afraid to "rough it up" or go into the corners, they can subconsciously be intimidated by this "press", and subsequently start to play "rough" aggressive hockey to prove that the newspaper has made an unfair judgement. When interviewing informants, many felt that players use violence to enhance their

chances of making it in the newspaper, and in some cases on television, since violence often appears to get excessive coverage.

The newspaper has on occasion made celebrities out of "policemen" and "goons". Often "policemen" will receive more accolades than "goal scorers". Adding to this problem, many junior players suggest that it is easier to start a "fight" or "intimidate" someone than to score a goal. Many juniors felt that some newspapers, along with its reporters, rarely fail in reporting some form of violence which has occurred in the game. "These papers continually give special attention to the big 'rough' players on the team" (W.D., 1974). A concerned junior coach recently commented, "I wish the newspapers would not over-emphasize the violence and 'blow-up' the fights - some of my players have adopted the 'tough' role, as a result." Junior hockey players are at a stage in their development where recognition is one of the "key" factors leading to a successful career. One of the means of recognition is through the media, and often players will go to any length to become recognized, even if it means becoming a "policeman" etc., especially when the professional "scouts" are looking for this type of player.

The maintenance process involved in the various "roles" is almost non-existent at the pre-professional level. The reason for this being that the average career of the junior player is usually short, and hardly enough time is available to become established in distinct "roles". Once players do become labelled, they generally have very little trouble maintaining their position, mainly because of the large turnover in players from year to year. Younger players

are more concerned with making the team than "testing" the "tough" players, and the so-called "veterans" are already established. Players do not stay at the pre-professional level long enough to build up solid reputations, especially now that professional teams can draft 18 year olds. Also, it is very difficult to maintain distinct "roles" when the players' talent is continually changing. As players improve skill-wise they invariably change "roles", and consequently "roles" are not necessarily kept very long. The most observable "role" change is that between "goon" and "policeman". In junior, as soon as the players labelled "goon" improve sufficiently enough to play regularly, they are unofficially promoted. Other "role" changes are less tangible. The fact that pre-professional hockey is a development stage and the players' abilities are constantly changing, makes it difficult to assess the maintenance process of the various "roles". The author found that "role" patterns were not as distinct and/or noticeable as they were in professional hockey.

In summary, junior hockey players become very familiar with the acceptable approach toward violent roles and the aggressive habits associated with them. This occurs because of positive and negative reinforcement from significant others such as the media, spectators, coaches, peers and professional "scouts". Junior hockey has become a "stepping stone" for many young male athletes who wish to advance to professional careers, and serves as a preparation stage whereby "hockey roles" are learned. The sole concern of the players is recognition from the professional "scouts",

to whom they must "show themselves". In order to "show themselves", some players resort to assaultive behavior by adopting "violent-oriented roles". Unfortunately these "roles" are encouraged by significant "others", through "courage drills" and the positive influence of spectators and media upon the players who adopt the various "roles". The majority of players adopting the "violent roles" are unskilled young first year players, and/or those who are physically "tough" and have large mesomorphic body types. These players are usually automatically inducted into the "violent roles". Since the time span of players in junior hockey is relatively short, the maintenance of roles is almost non-existent.

Upon graduation from junior, players must now face the difficult task of entering the professional ranks.

Professional Socialization

In this section the author will attempt to explain the socialization process of "violent roles" at the professional level, with emphasis on the major professional leagues. The general format will be similar to that which was used in the preceeding section.

The transformation of the "violent role" from junior to the professional ranks can be an intricate process. The junior players who assumed the "tough" role with the seventeen to nineteen year group must now enter a milieu where the participants are fully mature men. Although the young player has built up a reputation and respect in junior, he now becomes only a "rookie" to the professionals. The training and induction period must now begin again, from the "ground level".

All "rookie" players encounter many obstacles which must be overcome when entering professional hockey, although many of the initiation rites have become obsolete or forgotten with expansion and the increase of "high priced" juniors. This is especially evident amongst the exceptional juniors who are very talented. Today, many juniors are required to "step in" and immediately become team leaders with the club, both on the ice and off. Because of their exceptional talent these juniors by-pass the traditional induction phase. It is also very seldom that exceptionally talented juniors entering major professional hockey teams adopt the "violent roles". This is not to say that the talented juniors will not eventually adopt one of the "roles". Often many of the talented juniors eventually must adopt a "violent role" or some of the characteristics which are associated with a "violent role" in order to maintain their "superstar" status. More will be said about this later in the section.

As in junior hockey the average "rookies" must "show themselves", particularly during training camp and in the first few months of the regular season. During training camp the "rookies" must adopt the "tough" aggressive "role" so that he can impress the coach management, and teammates. Generally all the fights which occur during the training camp period include at least one "rookie", and in most cases, both combatants are "rookies". Firstly the "rookie" is attempting to win a position on the club and if he proves himself "tougher" and "stronger" than his competitors, this is to his advantage. Secondly, he must prove to both his coach and teammates that he can "handle himself" and is not afraid to "mix

it up". The majority of altercations which arise in training camp are those involved with fighting.

Once the regular season starts the "rookies" must continue to "show themselves", but in a more subtle manner. They must be aggressive and know when and where to fight, if necessary. The "rookie" players who immediately start to "rough-house" it and attempt to intimidate their opponents are skating on thin ice. Veteran professionals, who have been around the league for a few years ("journeymen") do not want an unproven "rookie" running around attempting to "show themselves". A "rookie" can get into serious trouble if he becomes impatient to prove himself physically too soon. To forcefully become involved in "fisticuffs" and be unfortunate to lose may often produce negative reinforcement, even though these players were accomplished "fighters" in junior. Without exception, "rookies" will be required to "show themselves" in the course of the season. The aggressive "rookie" will soon realize that the "veterans" are often out to "test" him as to how he will react in assaultive situations. Some "veterans" are expected and enjoy the task of "testing" a "rookie". They visualize this as having a deterrent or reformatory effect on the "rookie". Generally accepted as the most logical position to take regarding altercations in the first year, is to play aggressive and "tough" hockey, but not attempt to instigate trouble. Successful "rookies" are generally those who do not invite assaultive behavior, but do not "back down" when it arises.

Often "rookies" who have established themselves in junior will in time establish themselves in the major leagues. Players will command respect much more quickly if they pick their spots to fight rather than indiscriminately attempt to take on "all comers". It is not a good policy to have all the established players "test" you early. It could have a detrimental affect on a "rookie's" career. Being labelled a "goon", "intimidator" or "stickman" right from the start could result in the player becoming ostracized from the league. For example, during the author's professional hockey career he observed many heretofore minor leaguers and "rookies" who had reputations as "fighters", "antagonizers", etc., took it upon themselves to re-establish these reputations quickly and soon found themselves back in the minors.

It should be noted that it is not necessary for all "rookies" to be "tough" and skilled in the art of assaultive behavior, or even be aggressive-minded. Rather, the "rookie" must be capable physically of "handling himself" if the occasion presents itself. In essence, the "rookie" should not be intimidated to the point where he cannot or does not play in the manner that he is potentially capable of playing. A "rookie" player being intimidated will unconsciously adjust his style of play to stay away from the "heavy hitting" or going into the corners. These players are usually detected very quickly and labelled "chicken" or "yellow", and quite often unbeknown to the player in question. If these players do not readjust their style, they are sent down to the minors, or in a few cases, eliminated from professional league hockey.

Hockey, being a very physical game and somewhat brutal, does not cater to this type of player. The author has witnessed some very talented juniors or minor leaguers not "making it" for this reason alone. They had all the talents expected of a top professional except they lacked the necessary "toughness" to play in the major professional leagues. In dressing room jargon, they had no "jam".

Once again, as in the pre-professional level, body size is influential in determining the "role" of a "rookie" professional. Professional teams draft big tough, strong players who are expected to become "policemen". Because of their strength and size these players are labelled before they take to the ice. For example, large mesomorphic hockey players are seldom told officially what their "role" will be with the hockey team. Through the media and the hockey "grapevine" they become aware of their "roles". This is especially true if the large player has not had an outstanding junior career, but had the reputation of being an "animal" in junior. In recent years many of these players have gone in the first round of the junior draft. Major league professional teams have openly stated that they needed some "muscle" if they were going to win any championships. Publicly teams have indicated they are going to sacrifice speed and finesse for "muscle" in the junior draft. Scotty Bowman, coach of the Montreal Canadians, was quoted in the Montreal Gazette as saying, "With the players we have drafted, we're gonna have a killer hockey team next year" (Montreal Gazette, May, 1974). This seems to be the typical response of many major

league teams, as evidenced in the last two junior drafts (1973 and 1974).

Junior hockey players who have been drafted in the first or second round, ahead of proven "goal scorers", are knowledgeable enough about the professional hockey structure to realize why they were drafted. For example, a player 6'3" who weighs 200 pounds and only scored 30 goals in junior can see the "writing on the wall". He was drafted for "muscle" and in order to live up to the team's expectation, he automatically becomes inducted into a pre-determined "role". Today juniors are paid very highly and often will adopt any "role" that the team would like them to fulfill. The "rookie" professionals are rarely in a position to argue with their employers. This might change when they have been in the league a few years, but not in their "rookie" year. So, it can be said that the indoctrination into "violent roles" at the professional level begins with the drafting of junior players.

As previously described, some of the "violent roles" in professional hockey become self-evident, that is, the "rookie" professionals have the unofficial label on them before they have a chance to "show themselves". The roles which fall into this category are the "policeman" and "goon", and sometimes the "intimidator". As for the other "roles", it usually requires a longer period to become labelled a "stickman" or "antagonizer". Quite often these are reserved for the "veterans".

There are occasions when "rookies" have to adopt the role of "policeman" or "goon" because they cannot rely on their hockey talents

per se to remain on the team. If a "rookie" finds himself not playing regularly he may resort to the role of "policeman" or "goon", hoping to be played more. This strategy, if we may call it that, can be observed with professional teams who do not have an established "policeman". Young players continually vie for the role of club "policeman", especially if they possess the necessary characteristics.

When discussing the socialization process of the "rookie" professional, one cannot forget the influence of the counter roles. Oddly enough, the counter roles set the stage or justify to "rookies" the final decision in adopting particular "roles". It is usually the wish of every player, especially the "rookie", to help the team in every way possible, and if the counter roles in the players' life reinforce and reward aggression and fighting, then the player will usually comply with these expectations. Currently it seems to be very easy to receive positive reinforcement and approval for aggressive and violent behavior. One is reminded of an incident which occurred with a "rookie" professional on a major professional team, where the spectators, media coverage, and even teammates became very significant in the molding of a player's role. The player in question was strong physically and could "handle" himself quite easily in the "rough going", and was also adept at scoring (top "goal scorer" in junior hockey). Half way through the season the player started to fight more and his goal scoring contribution dropped off. When interviewing the player after the season, the author questioned the player as to why he had adopted the aggressive-

oriented "role". His reply, "I was accepted more for my fighting than for scoring goals." When asked to expand on this, the player went on to say:

I was having trouble scoring and started to play badly. Then, around January I got into a couple of good fights and won them handily. During the fights, the fans cheered more than if I had scored a goal. After the respective games the press came in and swarmed around me wanting interviews, not because I had scored a goal, but because I won the fight. They (press) kind of implied in the newspaper I was 'tough' and was the 'John Ferguson' of our team...Even the players (teammates) were congratulating and joking with me. I sure felt pretty good. From there, I guess I just started getting in more fights and playing more aggressively.

The above account is not atypical in the professional hockey ranks.. Players such as these who take on the role of "policeman", etc. feel they are as much "a part of the team" as the "goal scorers" and "checkers". With the emphasis on "muscle" and the role of "policemen" increasing over the last few years, these players have undoubtedly become a very significant factor in the team's success.

In today's vast coverage by the mass media "rookie" professionals often become awed and overcome by the power of the "press". Many junior players entering professional hockey have seldom had the opportunity to be extensively covered by the media. Now that they have turned professional the media caters to them and puts many of them in the "lime-light". Since the media seems to give equal coverage to both the "violent role" and the "goal scorer", "rookies" may take it upon themselves to pursue the former, rather than the latter, simply because the former role may be easier to achieve. The media and spectators provide a substantial amount of positive reinforcement to the majority of "violent roles". The only "role" which

is frowned upon by almost everyone is the "stickman" or "hatchetman". So in essence, there is only one "violent role" which receives negative reinforcement and the rest may appear attractive to the "rookie". As far as the "counter roles" are concerned, about the only adverse reaction towards the "violent roles" comes from the officials (referees) and the oppositions' spectators. But these are not considered significant and do not greatly influence the "roles" of players.

Let us leave the specific area of the "rookie" induction process and turn our attention to professional hockey in general. In the preceeding section the author indicated that "violent roles" are often adopted by players prior to their actually becoming an active participant, and many players, because of their physical characteristics and pre-professional learning experiences adopt labels very quickly, usually in their "rookie" season. As expected, some players in professional hockey do not become socialized or inducted into "violent roles" immediately - it often takes many years. There are many factors that influence a player's behavior once he has played a few years. Players will undoubtedly have to adjust and readjust their style and manner of play throughout their career. It could be that a player gets traded and he has to change his style to fit in with the new teams' philosophy, or a player might have to adopt a violent role in order to maintain his present status (i.e.: a "superstar"). Frequently, players may be required to change or adopt a new "role" as they become older and not as inclined to play their usual physical game. These, and other common factors, will be discussed throughout this section. The section will also discuss the

process whereby roles are maintained and, in some cases, dropped, either through necessity or otherwise.

Up until now, very little has been said about the antagonistic player or the player who uses his stick in a violent manner ("stickmen"). Fighting ability and "toughness" are considered the most viable method to achieve respect and ward off prospective punishment or retribution, but they are by no means the sole criteria. The "antagonizers" and "stickmen" have devised other techniques to command respect or to instil fear in their opponents. They have become very skillful at "upsetting" their opponents and in the art of intimidation by the use of the stick - or "equalizer". It has been referred to as the "equalizer" because of its equalizing effect on large tough physical players who could possibly make "short work" of the "stickman" in a fight. Some players have become just as competent with their stick as other players have with their "fists". As the name implies, the "equalizer" can do wonders in deterring "policemen" and "goons" from starting any altercations with a "stickman". Pugnacious "fighters" with neanderthal body types are very reluctant to challenge the stick. Generally, the noted "stickmen" are established "veterans" who do not habitually wield the stick without cause. They have, through years of experience, developed a "knack" so that they are seldom "caught" by the referee. They know when, where, how, and who to use the stick on. Conversely, the "veterans" know all about the "stickmen" and generally do not put themselves in a position where they are on the receiving end of the stick.

In a recent major league hockey game, a veteran player, remarked, "That M., he certainly is no angel with a stick in his hand." This remark was made after player M. had been caught using his stick on veteran players' teammate.

The majority of serious altercations occur between "rookies" (which might include 2nd year players) and established "stickmen". This occurs because the "rookies" want to see how far they can go before the "stickman" retaliates. Most "rookies" know who the "stickman" are. In professional hockey, when two teams play each other, new players on the team are usually informed by teammates what to expect from each of the opposition and react accordingly. Altercations between the "rookies" and "stickmen" occur simply because the "stickman" wants to introduce the "rookie" very early as to what to expect in the future. Strangely enough, his strategy rarely fails and the "rookie" approaches him very cautiously in subsequent meetings. Players who have been on the receiving end in an altercation with a "stickman" must wait their chance to "pay" retribution. Unexpectedly they must catch the "stickman" off guard or in a position where he cannot use his stick. As one veteran professional commented, after an incident with a "stickman", "It's a long season and we play against him ("stickman") five more times."

Players who intentionally "spear", "butt-end", or "high-stick" opponents become "marked men", and eventually are dealt with accordingly, if not by the players themselves, then by management. Players are easily motivated towards retaliation against this type of behavior, especially when a player is seriously injured, as a result.

There have been occasions when management or teammates have become so incensed over incidents involving the stick that they put a retaliation "price" on an opposing player. Not so much in terms of monetary reward, although bonus money has been offered by management, but players make it known that if someone was to "get even" with the opposing guilty player ("stickman") it would mean a lot to him. Since players "stick together" and "back each other up" in matters such as this, the favour is usually obliged. The author recalls an incident in which a teammate was butt-ended in the face, receiving a broken jaw and a fractured cheekbone. When the injured player returned to active duty he made it known that if anyone got the chance to "get even" with the player who threw the "butt-end" before he did, it would be greatly appreciated. As it was, the opposing player in question received a brutal beating from a teammate the next time the two teams met. Often players do not verbally ask for help because of their personal pride, but teammates know when assistance is required. It may be that the player being victimized is small and not physically capable of retaliating. In this instance he is not expected to retaliate, this is when the "goon" or "policemen" generally appear.

With regards to management offering bonus money to players who "get even" with the opponents, general managers have become infuriated with opposing players who have injured or attempted to injure their players, and consequently offered bonus money to any one who "gets even" with the "marked" player. One general manager had a personal vendetta against an opposing player and offered upwards

of 100 dollars to any one who "clobbers" player "A". The general manager said of "A", "He isn't the bravest guy in the world and for 100 dollars we've got some players who would clobber their mother" (Edmonton Journal, October 31, 1974). This particular general manager openly stated his intentions to offer "bounty money", a practice which is rarely done in professional hockey. If and when management offer "hit money", they do it in secrecy and in an undetectable manner for league purposes.

Returning to the discussion concerning "stickmen" and "antagonizers". These players are often diminutive in stature, as far as the average player is concerned, thus to some extent justifying their need to utilize the "equalizer" and/or aid from fellow teammates. For a large player to use his stick as a weapon is looked down on by other players. The large players have the advantage of their size and strength for protection and retribution, therefore the stick should not be used unless the situation warrants it. That is, if an opposing player starts wielding his stick at you, the large player is not expected to drop his because he is big. He must retain the stick for protection against his combatant. Players who drop their stick when confronted with a noted "stickman" could be put in a very precarious position. Until the "stickman" drops his stick or loses the services of it, the player is at the mercy of the "stickman". "Stickmen" and "antagonizers" seldom drop their stick unless they have to. When the smaller players are faced with a player of equal stature, he generally reverts to the conventional method of settling any differences, that being bare fists. Within

the unofficial sanctions of the rules it often becomes a matter of necessity for the smaller players to retain their stick when being threatened by a "goon" or large mesomorphic player. Smaller players are not expected to "battle it out" with "goons", "policemen", and "intimidators", unless, of course, he (smaller player) deserves to be punished. Possibly the smaller player might be a "stickman" or "antagonizer", who has "speared" or "butt-ended" the large player. Here, it becomes customary to have the smaller players taught a lesson. Although sometimes seemingly remote, the above behavior does, either directly or indirectly, have some bearing on the socialization of "violent roles" in hockey.

Earlier in the thesis the author made reference to players who become socialized or directed into roles because they are employed by teams having developed a philosophy which advocates "toughness" and "rough-house" tactics. Players entering these teams are obviously affected by the philosophy of the team. Frequently, players must adjust and readjust their style to become totally accepted by the team, especially if they have come from a team which stressed speed, finesse, and non-violent behavior. At the professional level, all "veteran" players are familiar with the basic style of each team, and seldom have to be told what is expected of them. The players must conform to expectations of the coach and team or suffer the consequences. It becomes a matter of playing the style the club dictates or being rejected by the team. Players then, often are forced to cater to the philosophy of the club.

It is interesting to observe players who have been traded or obtained from a team which is not noted for their physical prowess to a team which is overly aggressive and tough. It usually becomes only a matter of time before the players are caught up in the atmosphere generated by the team. The player learns that behavior not normally condoned by his former coach is accepted and sometimes advocated by his current coach. For this reason the player often changes his "role" on the team. The once timid hockey player who rarely reverted to assaultive techniques now becomes fearless because he knows the rest of the club will back him up in his actions. This behavior is sanctioned by the coach and teammates. There is a built-in confidence affect. The player realizes the club expects him to assert his newly found "toughness" and is rewarded accordingly.

There will obviously be a readjustment process for players going from a team who emphasizes "toughness" to a team whose coach would rather not see his player take unnecessary penalties and continually getting into fights. Although most coaches in professional hockey realize that fighting is almost unavoidable, some coaches stress a clean non-violent style of play, attempting to avoid assaultive behavior if possible. With the trend, as it is today, this latter philosophy of coaching is under close scrutiny. It appears that most professional teams have become forced to employ "policemen" and "goons" because of the success that this style of hockey has enjoyed in the past. Rough, intimidating hockey is being heralded by numerous coaches in junior and professional hockey. They feel that this was the reason that recent championship teams have become

so successful, consequently the philosophy of many coaches has changed or at least been modified. Indirectly this affects the players' "roles". If the coach feels that this type of hockey is going to win, then the players must produce this type of hockey. A coach of a major professional team publicly stated that:

This team is going to win a lot of games this year through intimidation. We have a big rough team who are not afraid to fight...we'll run them out of the rink - you watch (Edmonton Journal, October 18, 1974).

In professional hockey coaches' have developed tactics used to influence a player's behavior. For example, coaches will often sit players out so that they become angry and even hostile, then when returned to action, hopefully, the player may physically take it out on the opposition. If accomplished successfully, the player is rewarded by the coach, possibly verbally or by being returned to regular duty. It is usually understood that the player must continue to display this newly acquired style that won him a regular spot on the team. Reverting back to his old pacifist style could result in reinstatement to "spot-duty". Another method commonly used by coaches to instill aggression and "toughness" is through the media. When possible, the coach will inform the "press" that he would like to see player "B" play more aggressively and "throw his weight" around more than he is currently doing, or that the coach may make the statement, "if some players don't start playing more aggressively and are not willing to "mix it up, there will be changes." Many of these remarks that appear in the media

are psychological ploys directed at the players in order to influence their behavior. Through this method of communication, the coach, is in essence, saying he is unhappy with the way certain players are performing. As explained earlier, failing to comply often results in players being traded or sent down to the minors. From personal observation and research, this technique has become most successful, for the simple fact that it puts the onus on the players to produce or else. Indirectly, this gives the coach an "out". If the coach is questioned as to the recent poor showing of the team, at least he can inform his employers or the public that he has always demanded a physical style from his players and they are the ones to blame. The aggressive-minded coaches who advocate "toughness" and "rough-house" tactics usually remain the longest in their profession. It appears that the "nice guy" has to finish at the top or he soon finds himself presented with problems, all of which focus on his security with the team. Coaches therefore often find themselves in a position where they must adopt a predescribed philosophy which has become prevalent in the major professional level. With this in mind, one can see the profound influence that a coach has in shaping player "roles".

What the author has attempted to do in this section and, to some extent, the preceeding chapter, is to outline the dominating "violent roles" in pre-professional and professional hockey. As expected, there are players who use violent behavior and tactics who cannot justifiably be categorized into distinct roles. Players will often resort to the use of "violence" in order to maintain

their status as a "superstar". Occasionally, players with "superstar" status feel it is necessary to defend their "title". Since they are often the "prime targets" for players attempting to make a name for themselves, the "superstar" will on occasion resort to violence. This violence may come in the form of a fight, "spear", or deliberate attempt to injure their opponent. They generally commit the act openly. In this way, everyone sees what can happen if you intimidate or frustrate the "superstar". It serves as a deterrent to future attempts. Players now become aware of his (superstar) behavior when provoked. Characteristically, it seems that most "superstars" have a "mean" streak in them. Many, because of their status, feel they have the right to behave in this manner. Possibly, because of their superior talents, opposing teams have an obvious tendency to attempt to control or limit the play of the "superstar". As a result, the "superstar" may become irritated to the point of retaliation. The most frequent form of retaliation appears to be that which involves the stick, since it is the handiest in the situation. The "superstar" seldom fights.

Maintenance of Roles

In the analysis of the various "roles" associated with aggression and violence in professional hockey, one must explain the maintenance process of the "roles". Unlike pre-professional hockey, the players remain in the structure for a considerable length of time, if they are successful. The author will attempt to briefly discuss the characteristics that players adopt in order to maintain their

position in the professional hockey subculture.

Once players have assumed the role of "policeman", "goon", "intimidator", "antagonizer", and "stickmen", they take on responsibilities which must be fulfilled in order to maintain this "role". The two most significant factors by which players maintain their respective "roles" are respect and reputation. The easier of the two is reputation. Through constant repetition of the characteristics that designate each role, the player "builds-up" a reputation as being a "policeman" or whatever. The manner in which the player has "built-up" his reputation or maintains it will usually constitute the amount of respect he has earned. A player's "role" will also command a certain degree of respect - that is, the "policeman" is respected more than the "goon". It has also become a trend that more respect is given to the more talented players who occasionally adopt the violent role, which is one reason why the "superstar" is respected, and the "goon" is not. After a player has occupied the "role" for a number of years and becomes respected in it, the frequency of his involvement in altercations appears to drop off. In other words, he does not have to defend his "role" as he did when first establishing himself, and if he does, it usually involves a "rookie" or relatively new player. The established "veterans" respect his "role" and stay away from any trouble.

Because of their experienced reputations and respect the "labelled" players mere presence on the ice has the opposition play with caution. There are some players who, merely by their presence, can intimidate the opposition without having to resort

to violence. Their past history is well known around the professional hockey scene, and few are willing to provoke or "test" these players. They have become known as the "elite" of their respective "roles". It is generally agreed upon that the longer the player has occupied his "role", the more respect he has, consequently his "role" becomes less difficult to maintain.

Players with only average talents, and not considered the "elite" will usually have to engage in more altercations to insure their "role" on the team. This category goes to the younger players who are still "proving themselves". The younger players, because of their physical capabilities are expected to fight more than the older players. Older players can maintain their role as "policeman" and "antagonizer" as long as they meet the demands and expectations of their teammates. The older players limit their involvement to the serious altercations and become more of a "protector" than "enforcer". The "stickman" and "antagonizer" limit their involvement to "key" situations, and then only when they feel it is necessary. For example, the "antagonizer" might become predominant in important games possibly against a team who is competing for a play-off spot with his team, or in a play-off series. The "stickman" might reserve his actions for the "rookie" who is scoring regularly and playing well. Older players are rarely seen as "goons" or "intimidators". By the time a professional hockey player reaches "journeyman" status he either loses the "role" or has relinquished it to the younger players.

As players become older and experienced in their play they often

change "violent roles". This phenomenon has already been described earlier in relation to the "goon" and "policeman". Roles that require continual physical involvement often cannot be maintained and the players adopt a "violent role" which does not require them to fight. Those being the role of a "antagonizer" or "stickman". In summary, the players' role is maintained as long as they possess the qualities and characteristics befitting the "role" and live up to expectations that come with the role. Deviating from role behavior and expectations could result in loss of respect and identity with the "role". Having this happen the player could lose his position on the team or possibly continue to be part of the team without following the "violent role". It should be noted that the induction or "trial" period begins very early in ones career as a professional hockey player and once the player has established a distinct "role", he does not have too much difficulty in maintaining it. If he is going to lose it or readjust his "role", it is done in the early stages of his career.

III. ROLE CONFLICT AND ROLE STRAIN

In this section the author will attempt to discuss the role conflicts which may arise as a result of players being pushed into incompatible "roles". It may be that the conflict is internal (coach, teammates) or external (spectators, media). The discussion will focus on the internal conflict, particularly those involving the coach and general manager. When there are conflicts between

individuals or groups, one of the parties must compromise in order to resolve the conflict. The resolution of role conflicts will be discussed, where applicable.

The most common role conflict in hockey occurs between the coach and player. With the upsurge of "bully-boy" tactics the coaches today will often instruct players to fight or get physically aggressive. At the pre-professional level this tactic is used frequently. Because of the control that the coach has over junior hockey players, role conflicts are almost non-existent. When they do exist, they do not usually involve violent behavior. Hockey players at the professional level formulate self-images and role expectations which they like to feel they control to some extent. Manipulation by the coach and/or general manager may affect a player's behavior. This may result in a conflict of expectations between roles. For instance, a player may see himself as tough, and aggressive and willing to fight if provoked but does not consider himself a "policeman" or "goon". Now the management wants this player to play the role of "policeman" or even of lower status, a "goon". Since the player has already set standards regarding expectations of himself, deviating from them in the above fashion may well affect his performance. One professional hockey player who had played for two years was asked by his coach to start to "mix it up" and informed the coach that, "he was not a 'goon' and he was not going to act like one". In the above case the player did not assume the role of "policeman" or "goon" and nothing developed. In contrast to this illustration of role conflict, there are players who often are pressured into adopting a "violent role" as a result of coach-player conflict. If the

player has a long term, "no trade", "no cut" contract, he can defy the coach's instructions and very often resume his original status on the team. Not having a secure contract, many players may have to behave according to the coaches expectations. Some "rookies" who enter the major professional leagues have role conflict problems. The "rookie" who dominated the junior league with his size and strength may not enjoy the same success at the professional level. He may find it very difficult to play the same "role" he had in junior and thus find himself deviating from his expected role behavior. When this happens the management usually disapproves and the player is re-evaluated. The resolution in this case is that the player is traded or given the ultimatum - "to play tough and aggressive or we'll have to find someone else".

Although not as significant, there are conflicts which arise where the player wants to play a physical game and the coach disapproves. Here, you have the coach continually reprimanding the player who adopts a "violent role". Strangely as it may seem there are coaches in major professional leagues who profess to this style of hockey for some of their players. Again, players find it difficult to control their emotions. The resolution here is usually a compromise between the coach and player.

Internal role conflicts between player and teammates occur both at the junior and professional levels. They commonly occur when players adopt a "role" and then deviate from the "role".

Teammates formulate expectations from certain players and adjust their play accordingly. If a player assumes the role of "policeman" or "tough guy" he is expected to behave as the "role" implies. An example would be a player who is considered a "policeman" or "intimidator" yet fails to step-in when needed or does not "protect" his teammates. At first, very little attention is paid to this behavior, but if continued the players are questioned in a very subtle manner as to why the sudden change in style. The manner of questioning becomes somewhat less discreet at the pre-professional level where the players are younger and more likely to discuss the matter openly. Players tend to resolve any differences or conflicts between teammates quickly because it is more comfortable to play when there is harmony rather than the dissension which usually will occur if there are lasting role conflicts. In professional hockey, players must have the backing and confidence of their teammates to function effectively.

In competitive hockey, as in other competitive sports, the spectators and media often take it upon themselves to assess players capabilities and what his role should be with the team. If the player falters in the role expectations they have established for him, the media and spectators are quick to point this out, which usually causes a minor role conflict. For some unknown reasons the "press" feel this is newsworthy and must inform the public. The conflict is referred to as "minor" because generally the players are least affected by this form of harassment, even though most players are conscious of their public image. Hopefully,

the media and spectators, through continual harassment, will instill the past aggression and behavior normally associated with the player. If the player is concerned enough over public image he will resolve the conflict by resorting to their demands. If he is not concerned and the management is happy with his current style, the player will not succumb to their demands and will not be influenced. Until the fans and media become accustomed to the player's newly found style or his determination to play his own style, he remains at the mercy of the "rail birds".

There have been incidents in professional hockey where the media, along with the spectators, have built up a conflict which resulted in animosity between players and public. Conflicts such as these could possibly be detrimental to one's career. Players have been known to be traded or sometimes eliminated from professional hockey because they had received so much pressure from the external counter roles (media, spectators). The reason that management gives in to such a decision surrounds the welfare of the team and the individual player. It is for the betterment of both concerned. It appears that the media and spectators are prone to violent behavior and expect to witness this behavior from the players who have been labelled "policemen", etc. Applying the right pressure to the right player, the media and spectator can be devastating. Therefore, professional hockey players do not attempt to arouse any conflicts between the media and the spectators.

In summary, the pre-professional and professional levels of competitive hockey fosters and condones various "roles" which deal

closely with aggression and violence. Players who continually use brutal tactics in their style of play are unofficially labelled. The most common labels or "violent roles" are, "policeman", "goon", "intimidator", "antagonizer", and "stickman". Since the violent roles that may be occupied within hockey are not present at birth, they must be learned through a process known as socialization. This process starts early in a hockey players' career but has its greatest impetus during the pre-professional and early professional stages. In contrast to the trial-and-error learning method, most "role" learning in hockey occurs via imitation and modelling and the interaction with significant others found within the hockey milieu. The significant others or "counter roles" possess the influence to change existing "roles" or have players learn and adopt "violent roles" at almost any stage in the socialization process. Also, very important in the process is how "roles" are maintained and what are the ramifications of "role conflicts". From the data presented in this chapter, one can see that the process whereby "violent roles" are learned have become vital as part of the total hockey structure. The "violent roles" in hockey receives just as much emphasis as the non-violent roles.

When attempting to explain aggression and violence in hockey it must be realized that no distinct explanation can account for it as a unitary concept. Rather, it is an interactionary process involving a mixture of the three theories so described in Chapter II, along with individual factors, and those situations mobilizing

the individual into violent roles. It would appear, however, that from the present data, much of the aggression and violent behavior found in the hockey subculture is socially acquired behavior which is learned. Consequently, much of the violence is a product of our culture. This is not to say that all violent behavior is unwarranted. In fact, violence as a protective device, to some degree, has helped us in our evolution. Indirectly this has carried over to the sporting context. This might be especially true when explaining or justifying the innate theory and/or frustration theory of aggression. These theories, to a certain extent, become semi-legitimate as a functioning part of the interactionary process of sports.

Since the study presents a significant amount of evidence supportive of the proponents of the social learning theory, we may assume that the role analysis described does in fact, account for the process whereby individuals become somewhat manipulated or forced into distinct violent roles. Therefore, it appears that violence in hockey is greatly affected by roles. Consideration must be given to the realization that individuals have been indirectly or directly forced to comply with expectations and norms through the present socialization process. Obviously it does not have to be that way. By re-structuring the socialization process whereby violent roles are de-emphasized and discouraged, one could successfully alter the existing process, and thus eliminate much of the violence in hockey. Further discussion regarding this matter will be presented in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VI
INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION
OF VIOLENCE IN HOCKEY

This chapter has been divided into three sections; the first section dealing with a discussion and assessment of the various theories of violence and aggression in professional hockey in light of the present data; the second dealing with a discussion of the net effect that the professionals have on violence, and the third section concerned with a discussion of possibilities for change in the existing structure.

I. DISCUSSION OF THEORIES OF
VIOLENCE IN PROFESSIONAL HOCKEY

Innate Theory of Aggression and Violence

The main assumption behind the innate theory for violence and aggression in sports is that fighting is instinctual in man. This theory's two foremost proponents are Lorenz (1964) and Ardrey (1966) and to some extent Tiger (1969). They suggest that sports should attempt to educate man to a conscious and responsible control of his own fighting urge, and that fighting in sports, in this case hockey, is due to "an internal urge to attack." The present data would indicate that this "urge to attack" does not always culminate with fighting. It is clearly noticeable from the data in this present study that fighting is but a small part of the violence in hockey. It appears to be the nature of fighting and it's subsequent side effects that has led to increased violence. This can

not be accounted for by the innate theory alone.

In North America it is widely held that fighting is the most viable method to release the hockey players pent up emotions. It reputedly serves as the "best safety valve around in hockey" (Campbell, 1974). In essence, Campbell is saying that if man is going to become violent in sports, a natural occurrence, he does so in the safest way possible. Campbell's (1974) philosophy regarding fighting would tend to support Lorenz's hypothesis that "basically athletes have an instinctual urge to attack and actually seeks the opportunity to indulge in "fighting". From the present data and personal observation, the author would agree that usually no one is seriously physically injured as a result of fist fighting. However, the psychological harm from fighting and its presence can be seen throughout the various levels of hockey. Having to be continuously on guard for the opposition's "policeman" or "goon" undoubtedly will have an effect on one's play.

Campbell and his followers feel that if they banned fighting in hockey, players would seek various other forms to display their urge to attack. These other forms such as "spearing", "butt-ending", "high-sticking", and "kicking" are more liable to result in serious injury and are less accepted in sport. Knowledgeable hockey persons who advocate Campbell's philosophy suggest that if fighting is removed from the sport, these other forms will become prominent. They appear to base their premonition on what is observed in leagues where fighting is not tolerated (e.g., European hockey, college hockey). From observing the international style and having played college

hockey, it may appear that Campbell has some merit in his philosophy. The fact that international and college hockey may have noticeably more "stickwork" in their hockey can not be totally accounted for because of the "no-fight" rule. Various other factors come into play, such as those discussed in Chapter V.

There is evidence to show that banishing fighting does not automatically produce violent behavior as suggested by Campbell's hypothesis. There are many leagues and levels of competitive hockey where there is no fighting and the evidence of "spearing", "high-sticking" and "butt-ending" does not exist, as forecasted by the higher echelon of professional hockey (Harris, 1974; Drake, 1974; Smith, R. 1974). In fact the greater percentage of amateur hockey currently does not allow fighting. It seems that youngsters adapt very quickly to almost any style of hockey pending the demands and emphasis of the adults. It would suggest that if the youngsters can adapt so readily - why can't the adults!

It has been generally acknowledged (Bandura and Walters, 1963; M.D. Smith, 1971-1974; Vaz, 1972-1974; McPherson, 1974; Faulkner, 1973) that the innate/instinctual explanation of aggression and violence is giving way in part to the social learning theory, and partially to the frustration-aggression hypothesis. The present data and general observations tend to agree with that general trend. When discussing the present data's bearing on the explanation of the instinct

theory, many of the informants felt that the urge to attack, regardless of manner, was not so much instinctual, but rather traditional or conventional. The amount of substantiated evidence regarding violence and overt aggressive behavior in hockey, as instinctual in nature, still remains inconclusive and would require further investigation.

Frustration-Retaliation Theory of Aggression and Violence

When discussing the various causes and nature of overt aggression and violence in sport, one cannot overlook the theory which hypothesizes that frustration often leads to reactive aggressive behavior and/or violence (Dollard et al, 1940; Alderman, 1974). Some psychologists and sociologists feel that most aggression in sport results from frustration, or as a result of various motives being thwarted or blocked. In more recent times it has been felt that the above theory cannot alone account for all aggression and violence and must be augmented with the social learning theory (Bandura et al, 1963-1971).

With regards to this theory, of particular interest, is the connection that frustration has to retaliation in the explanation of aggressive behavior in hockey. Retaliation in sports, especially hockey, is a principal source of aggressive and violent behavior. Hockey players feel that they must retaliate in order to preserve their manlihood and self-image.

Assault and the use of illegal tactics will often occur in hockey when a player is prevented from achieving his performance objectives during a game. If a player is continually prevented from

achieving these objectives, he may become quite frustrated and/or angry, and because he cannot remove this frustration by achieving the original objective he will displace his anger and aggressiveness to a substitute object (such as another player) and attack it aggressively, usually in a violent manner, in order to eliminate the frustration. In hockey, the substitute object (player) almost invariably fights back, thus aggression is even more strongly evoked. The hypothesis that fighting reduces aggressive tendencies would appear to remain in question. Fighting in hockey as a manifestation of aggressiveness does not necessarily alleviate the player's frustration (Alderman, 1973). In fact, it often increases the desire to aggress more readily and thus become habitual - especially if the aggressor was successful in relieving some of his frustration. The player's tolerance to control his frustration may be lessened and he may become quicker to try to alleviate the frustrations. As a result, reactive aggressive behavior tends to become habit forming. Evidence and data would appear to substantiate this suggestion. Many informants indicated to the author that since they had often had success at removing or displacing their said frustrations by means of inflicting a violent act upon an opponent, they soon realized the benefits which were incurred as a result. Consequently, players would often adopt a violent role model in order to reduce their frustrations. From the present data in the study, the frustration theory could be held accountable for a limited number of the players who take it upon themselves to permanently adopt a violent role model. Although this theory is often the

motivation for some players adopting violent roles, it was felt that it did not, to a great extent, adequately offer justification for the frustration explanation for aggression.

Retaliation appears to be synonymous with frustrating and/or provoking experiences. When a player retaliates it usually suggests that illegal tactics were used against him, therefore, one must retaliate to protect his self-image. Traditionally, hockey players act in a retaliatory manner in reaction to any use of assaultive behavior against them. Retaliation is indirectly a form of revenge in hockey. One might ask, why is revenge such a deep-seated and intense passion? Erich Fromm, in his recent book, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, comments:

Revenge may be said to be a magic reparation; but assuming that this is so, why is this desire for reparation so intense? Perhaps man is endowed with an elementary sense of justice; this may be because there is a deep-rooted sense of "essential equality" (Fromm, 1973: 118).

In conjunction with retaliation, fighting and the use of injurious behavior in hockey is a spontaneous reaction. Spontaneous outbursts occur in hockey because of its fast pace. Incidents of casual violence happen so fast that one does not have time to think, just react. Often serious injuries are inflicted upon opponents as a direct result of a players' spontaneous reaction to being hurt. The general rule of thumb amongst the hockey professional is that if you have been injured through "foul play", retaliation is in order. The immediate impulse is to strike back no matter how tall, or broad, or muscled a player may be. You always have the "equalizer" (i.e., the stick). It is not known whether this spontaneous quest

for retaliation is instinctual or if it has been inbred into our game through prior learning experiences.

The present data does not support the hypothesis that frustration or revenge always leads to aggressive behavior or violence. From considerable personal observation and experience the author does feel, however, that a limited amount of violent behavior (assault included) may result from frustration. From the data it appears that the frustrating experience usually instigated action that was learned or acquired through prior socialization.

The main contention among the proponents of the frustration-aggression hypothesis is that by removing or alleviating ones' frustration, the individual reduces his desire to aggress. From the study it appeared that, rather than reduce the likelihood of an individual to aggress, the frustration aggression explanation of aggression and violence appeared to have an increasing effect on one's desire to aggress. The players' found when adopting a violent attitude or position, their opponents were less likely to frustrate them, consequently the players used aggression and violent behavior to ward off frustrating experiences. When attempting to answer the explanation of frustration, no single answer can hope to explain the theory alone, however, it becomes a mixture of the various theories together, with greater emphasis directed toward the social learning explanation.

Social Learning Theory of Aggression and Violence

Many psychologists currently feel that most aggression and violent behavior are acquired or learned through socialization processes and

cultural indoctrination (Bandura and Walters, 1963; M.D. Smith, 1972; McPherson, 1974). This process begins at birth and continues throughout the life cycle of one's existence on earth. The individual is capable of being taught new forms of behavior at any stage in the life cycle, although researchers feel that the most influential time state is between childhood and late adolescence. During this period the individual is exposed to significant factors which will influence his behavior. The two most significant factors are identification and imitation. Youngsters are socialized into sports in much the same manner as they are into society in general. They must receive guidance and direction from the adults. When learning sport roles one must identify with those who have become successful and justly rewarded for their endeavours. By imitating role models the child becomes socialized into social structure (Bandura et al, 1961). From the data presented in this thesis there is a great deal of evidence to show that sport roles are not inborn in an individual, but are acquired and learned by identification, imitation, and emulation. In today's society there is a widespread approval of violence in sport and this has been shown in the recent upsurge of violence in hockey.

If in fact violence is acquired or learned through identification and emulation of role models, which the present data tend to suggest, then the game of hockey does an admirable job in providing violent models. It would appear then, from the data presented here, that Bandura's modelling theory does provide an adequate explanation for the prime causes of violence in hockey. This, coupled with the violent attitudes of society and widespread technical production of violence in the media, has created an atmosphere in which individuals condone

and appreciate violence in hockey. It would appear from present observation and research that a large portion of the hockey structure feel violence is unavoidable and part of the game. One knowledgeable hockey observer stated, "We teach violence to young players to an extent that has never been known before".

Bandura and his associates maintain that it is the influence of significant others that shape, mold, and direct an individual toward preferred "roles" and the behavior we expect from them. As evidenced by the data and material presented in Chapter V, this, to a great extent, is true. During the interviews with pre-professional and professional hockey players the author asked if the players felt the violent aggressive behavior displayed was instinctual or if it was acquired and learned throughout one's hockey career. Without hesitation the players answered "yes" to the latter. Upon further questioning, most of the players felt that the way the hockey structure is set-up today one cannot avoid becoming involved with violent behavior. If all the emphasis were directed toward non-violence from day one, then hockey would likely be almost violence free. Some of the players felt that there are individuals who are more likely to become violent than others. That is to say, they have a deeper urge to aggress, but not necessarily an instinctual urge. When channelled or redirected properly, aggression can be a satisfying experience. Our society has in many ways rewarded aggression unjustly. Players are made to believe that assaultive and violent behavior are necessary in order to have a gratifying experience.

However, when aggressive tendencies are mis-used and directed toward violent activity, many are lead to believe that the only reason the individual behaves in a violent manner, is that he has been a "born fighter" from the start. They neglect to study his past history of aggression. The author suggests that if one could possibly study individuals from very early childhood to their present position (in hockey), the social learning theory versus the instinctual theory of aggression and violence would be resolved. The author is inclined to believe the social learning theory would prevail, at least from the data and research available at present.

Throughout the study the author has indicated that the social learning theory of aggression does account for a large part of violent behavior in hockey. As depicted by the material in Chapters IV and V, much of the present data in this study was devoted to the Social Learning Theory whereby hockey players are reared by a process known as socialization. When investigating the present data one can observe that the theory alone cannot possibly account for all of the aggression (reactive and instrumental) and violence in hockey. However, it does, at present, appear to be the most viable of single explanations of violence in hockey.

II. NET EFFECT OF THE PROFESSIONALS

Who is really to blame for the violence that has riddled North America hockey? Some say it is the professionals, others say it

starts at the amateur level with the young players. Constantly, it seems each body is condemning the other as being responsible for the increase of violence. The amateur bodies are inferring that the professionals are providing a style of hockey not conducive to amateur play. They believe that the influence of professional hockey with its emphasis on winning and the use of violence as a tactical instrument to achieve that goal has produced a bad model for the amateurs to emulate. On the other hand, the professionals are suggesting that the administrators of minor hockey are to blame, not the kids. Today parents, coaches, and the administration in general are encouraging violence. The professionals infer that if they want to stop the violent behavior in minor hockey, they can. They do not have to cater to the professional structure. Howie Meeker, former professional hockey player and coach, puts most of the blame on the parents. He states, "we need to educate the parents...if the parents were barred from the rink you would likely clean up the game considerably" (Howie Meeker, Hockey Night in Canada, December 14, 1974). No doubt this great debate could last forever. The author believes that both bodies share the responsibility and must attempt to work together in presenting a better image for the game. Both must reassess their existing structure and make the necessary changes.

From the present study, the author suggests that the net effect of the professionals on violence can be divided into three areas; (1) the emulation factor - often the professionals do not provide the best model image for youngsters to identify with, (2) the

structure itself - it is professionally oriented to the ultimate goal of winning irregardless of strategy and methods employed, and (3) the media exposure - the media is indirectly responsible for magnifying the violence at the professional level. These are three areas in which major criticism was directed at when discussing violence in professional hockey.

Emulation Factor

The effect of stars on youngsters is very significant. Time and time again the data has demonstrated the powerful effect that role modelling has on up-and-coming young hockey players. Players, young and old, continually look to the professionals for guidelines and styles which they can pattern themselves after. When searching for the ideal techniques and skills of the game, one is naturally going to look to those who have become most successful, and these usually are professional stars. Unfortunately, the professional stars are not always in the best position to offer themselves as Beneficial role models. Having youngsters emulate professionals who are supposedly the best may often prove disastrous in the long run. This may be well demonstrated by an incident observed by the author among a group of twelve year olds in a neighborhood garage. The young boys were playing ball hockey and when the author stopped and questioned them to see if they were having fun, one of the youngsters replied, "this is great, we're the Boston Bruins and they (pointing to the opposition) are the Philadelphia Flyers, and every little while we drop our sticks and gloves for fights...

like the pros do in the NHL." This incident is typical of the response given by many youngsters who have taken upon themselves to emulate the professionals.

As seen by the role analysis of the violent hockey model, it is easy to understand why youngsters would want to emulate such action. The role analysis, along with the abundance of players going to the violent-oriented role model, indicates just how important this dimension of the game has been stressed in recent years. It would be naive to think that youngsters should disregard the undesirable models in professional hockey and only select those which offer the correct and acceptable style. As depicted in the role analysis of role models, the violent role is becoming as dominating as the non-violent role, and to a certain extent acceptable as legitimate behavior.

Amateur hockey has been noticeably affected by the professional model. Granted, the professionals have a great deal to offer the amateur scene in the way of developing superior talents. To have young players watch and imitate major professional superstars can only be beneficial in demonstrating how many of the skills of the game should be developed. It is the adverse incidents and mannerisms that have presented all the problems. The use of violent behavior is being witnessed and used as a strategy for team victory. The philosophy normally adopted by the professionals is often emulated at all levels of hockey. With the reinforcement and rewards that are given to violent role models in professional hockey, some-

times the only alternative for the youngster is to adopt this specific model.

The thing that disturbs the author is the fact that many professionals appear at times to instigate or publicly acknowledge their "role" as being successful and gratifying. Having young players hear or read quotes such as the following can only enhance a players decision to emulate this kind of behavior. "I'm more valuable in the penalty box than I am sitting on the bench" (Globe and Mail, May 6, 1974), and "I'm not gonna stop fighting even if I could. It's one of my assets and if it helps win games I'm going to keep fighting" (Windsor Star, June 4, 1974). Far too often players do not take the necessary precautions to avoid creating a bad image of themselves. They do not appear to realize the ramifications of their behavior. Often professionals get "caught up" in the professional structure and fail to see or realize the full effect that they have on amateur hockey. Players adopting violent roles usually do not equate their behavior to what is right or good, but to what is necessary or most rewarding. This is one area in which the professionals could help immeasurably. That is, strive to portray a public image conducive to a non-violent style of play.

Winning - The Ultimate Goal

The total professional structure revolves around the ultimate goal of winning. There is an overriding value of winning and the use of physical coercion to enhance it. Because of the prestige and financial rewards available at the professional level, players

and management direct all their attention toward winning at any costs. In this modern era of hockey, professional teams have attempted to blend brutality with the natural skills of the game to produce a championship team, and have developed a successful formula. Aggressiveness, toughness, nastiness, and the correct amount of talent are the main ingredients. This is not an easy task, as many major professional coaches will sadly testify.

Seeking to find the correct blend of talented and tough players, teams are stressing intimidation and the recruitment of "policemen" and "goons" and consequently there is more violence. Lawrence Martin, Toronto based sports writer, suggests that the dimension of the physical intimidator is becoming more and more indispensable to successful hockey teams (Toronto Globe and Mail, January 18, 1975).

The present study would seem to verify this fact. Personally the author feels that the hockey has not become rougher, but more violent. One of the reasons for this is due to expansion. In the past the major professional leagues were reserved for highly skilled players who had to rely on their speed, finesse, shooting, etc. to make it. With expansion, major professional teams have had to resort to employing specialists who are not required to possess too much talent per se. There are often players playing on major professional teams who are poor shooters, skaters, checkers, but they are very adept at flexing their physical talents, consequently they have become an indispensable member of the team. Players who rank high in penalty minutes are in demand. These players are judged or assessed, not by their goals or assists, but by the

number of penalties they have accumulated. This statistic is an important credential because, at the professional level, it is a "yardstick" for toughness and aggressiveness. Unfortunately for the game, the most successful major professional hockey clubs have had the highest total in penalty minutes, which has set a precedent for many other teams to follow (Hockey News, 1972, 1973, 1974). Teams are resorting to this strategy both at the amateur and professional level. With the influx of teams recruiting "policemen", "goons", "intimidators", etc. in order to become successful, both at the box office and on the ice, the demand for such players directly affects the socialization of pre-professional and minor hockey hopefuls.

The effect that the above philosophy and/or strategy has had on amateur hockey is reflected in the current style and emphasis that is put on winning. From research (McPherson, 1974; M.D. Smith, 1972, 1974) it would seem that many minor league coaches (amateur and pre-professional) are adopting the professional philosophy of winning with the use of "muscle". The typical response with the amateur coach is that, "if it works for the pro's, it should work for us", without seriously looking at the talent on their specific hockey teams. It would be nice to believe that bringing "muscle" onto a team automatically results in success. There are many other factors needed, but often coaches do not realize this. For this reason, many coaches unintentionally create a problem which usually culminates in violence. The ultimate goal in amateur hockey must be

separated from that of the professional goal. A great deal of criticism has been directed at the amateur level because coaches and parents have in fact attempted to follow the professional philosophy. Being realistic, youngsters, and often mature adolescents, cannot cope with the pressures and expectations that professionals are subjected to. It is because of this that amateur hockey has suffered. We must de-emphasize this ultimate goal of winning, if we want to see a decrease in the amount of violence in amateur, and to a certain extent, professional hockey in North America.

A trend that has evolved at the pre-professional level of hockey is that players often shunt aside winning and concentrate on establishing their own reputation. In this case winning has become secondary to their own priority, that of establishing themselves at the expense of the team. In short, winning has succumbed to recognition and personal reward. This will inevitably occur when a team has been mathematically eliminated from advancing to the play-offs, or cannot better their position in league standings. As indicated in the previous chapter, it will also frequently occur when a team is losing or winning by a margin too great to overcome. To a great extent it would appear that personal recognition becomes team recognition, especially at the pre-professional level and particularly with players who are draftable. Outside of this factor winning is the major concern and teams have reverted to almost anything to achieve it.

Media Exposure of Professional Hockey

When discussing the net effect of the professionals on the total hockey scene, the effect of the media inadvertently arises. Many feel that professional hockey has always had violent behavior but rarely was it exposed. With the onslaught of more televised games and expansion of major professional hockey, the violence and aggression is being magnified. Professional hockey is getting more coverage than it did a decade ago. With expansion, major league hockey has been introduced to a much larger populace, consequently it receives more coverage in local newspapers and television stations. Where it was once only necessary to give game summaries and highlights, it has now become almost mandatory to report about everything which occurred in the game, including violence.

The major criticism is not at the televising of hockey games; but the apparently inordinate amount of coverage that violence receives. Hockey has always had the violent element in it, but it appears that television networks are exploiting the violent aspects. This is evident when a fight erupts, television panders to it by making sure everybody sees the incident three or four times, complete with stop-action slow motion and an unofficial judgement about who won what round of what fight. The same holds true for a "spear", "butt-end" or an unnecessary "cheap-shot". One might ask, how can we stop the emphasis on violence by television? It is up to the public to stop it. Pierre Juneau, chairman of the Canadian Radio-Television Commission, says "he is surprised by the amount of violence in televised professional hockey

games, but won't take action unless there is a public outcry"

(Edmonton Journal, August 31, 1974).

The newspaper is also responsible to some degree for the increase in violence, as a result of its coverage of professional hockey. The newspaper is second to none when it comes to reporting violence. The "press" has tremendous power, and if they wish, could certainly help turn the game around. The sports pages do not seem to be a logical place to emphasize the realism of violence. One would almost believe that reporters go out of their way to report fights and violent behavior at hockey games. To some the brutal aspects of the game has become their frame of reference. Personally the author feels many of the sports reporters could use some discretion in their reporting of violent behavior in hockey games.

The underlying effect from the overplay of hockey violence in the media can be summed up as, the blunting of sensitivity - almost dehumanizing at times. Many of the players have become hardened, they have been conditioned by the media to an acceptance of casual violence and overt behavior unbecoming sportsmanlike conduct. Mass media in many instances is fostering an area of legitimacy of violence. As a result it is not unusual that young hockey players get the idea that violence is alright if it receives attention and apparent approval which in most cases it does. The professional players are not responsible for the coverage they receive from the various media sources. The players

are generally not concerned how the game is reported and in what manner. There is not a hue-and-cry amongst the professionals to report all the violence which occurs in the game. The "press" take it upon themselves to report violent behavior with the idea that it is what the public wants. There has been evidence to show that, "if you give it to the public long enough, they'll accept it," (Wertham, 1969; McMurtry, 1974a). Having the public (players included) continually read about the violence in hockey, will eventually have them expecting to see violence regularly at hockey games. If we are to rectify the problem of violence in hockey, both at the amateur and professional levels, it is time we paid some attention to the coverage it receives.

In summary, the net effect that professional hockey players and the hockey structure has on aggression and violence is three-fold. Firstly, the emulation factor in which young players identify to and imitate is not conducive to the proper development of hockey skills. Secondly, the professional structure overstress winning and indirectly this has lead players and coaches to think in terms of winning at all costs, regardless of tactics and strategy employed. Sportsmanship and fair play is no longer the ultimate goal in amateur hockey. Although it still exists; it has become almost obscure at the competitive level. Thirdly, the media exposure that professional hockey receives is not appropriate for the viewing audience. The media is magnifying violence in hockey so that youngsters are beginning to accept it as right and good. By means of the media hockey players, young and old, are being mis-educated about the game. One hockey observer, who wanted to remain anonymous, best

summed it up with his comment:

The glitter and spectacle of professional hockey over the past few seasons has left a bitter legacy for the countless thousands of children and young men playing the game. They were probably the most violent on record. For a sport which claims to build character and spirit among young Canadians the roll call of distasteful incidents makes depressing reading and viewing indeed.

III. POSSIBILITIES FOR CHANGE

After discussing, explaining, observing and researching the nature and causes of violence at the pre-professional and professional levels of hockey, the author attempted to suggest possible changes that might alleviate some of the violence. The study directed its attention to three areas; (1) rule structure, (2) administration, and (3) players, coaches, parents and fans. An attempt was made to limit the possible changes to those that could be felt immediately and to those which could be realistically incorporated without changing the overall structure.

When discussing possibilities for change the author believes we must rely on the social learning explanation and socialization processes to instigate change. It is in this area that the innate explanation might receive some criticism. If the innate theory was totally accepted as being the main cause of aggression and violent behavior, then little could be done to alleviate the problem of violence in hockey. If it is generally accepted that violent roles and aggression are primarily a product of our culture and a result of the socialization process, then by changing or altering the

process and/or modifying the rules, we may be able to change the structure and thus eliminate the violent roles. It may not be realistic to think that all the violent roles could or should be eliminated. In some respects, aggression and violent roles have become a functional aspect of the sport.

The main contention regarding change is that players have been, to a great extent by the socialization process and the professional structure itself, forced and manipulated into becoming "policemen", "goons", etc. As indicated by the data in Chapter V, the roles and socialization process appear to be role governed, reinforced and learned. It becomes apparent that if change is in order we must change the reinforcement of violent roles, and the process whereby violent roles become sanctioned. In order to instigate change and discourage players from selecting or becoming forced into violent roles we must provide negative reinforcement for these roles so described. The present structure must be modified. The learned roles can be modified by changing the rules that govern the roles. By eliminating the positive value and reinforcement associated with violent roles, it would appear logical that the roles and role models would soon disappear. Having the role models which exhibit aggressive and violent forms of behavior no longer available would ultimately lead to a decrease in opportunities for imitation and/or identification by younger players. Through the enforcement of rules which prohibit players from adopting violent roles, players would have to conform to the changes or be eliminated. It must become disadvantageous for a team to have members who continually adopt violent attitudes and exhibit violent role behavior. Teams and individual

players will often attempt to "test" and/or manipulate the rules of the game to their advantage. By imposing tighter restrictions and enforcement of certain rules, much of the violent behavior, as it exists today, could be eliminated.

An example of this was seen recently in minor hockey, where the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association have imposed strict rules regarding the use of the stick (Edmonton Journal, May 22, 1975). By increasing the length and seriousness of penalties for illegal use of the stick, they hope to discourage players from using the stick as a weapon. Although these added restrictions pertain primarily to amateur hockey, it is a step in the right direction. The following section will attempt to deal with further possibilities for change and areas of concern.

Rule Structure

The rules of the game are one of the most important means of creating a suitable environment where skill and positive attitudes are reinforced over the negative aspects such as the tactical use of violence. It is the purpose of the rules to keep the game under control so that the players can develop the skills of the game without having to be concerned or pre-occupied with defending themselves from illegal tactics. The general consensus is that there does not need to be a large number of rule changes, but a closer scrutiny and enforcement of many of the existing rules. Most feel that, "the rules are already in the book, all we have

to do is enforce them, the officials must call the infractions more closely". Often, many of the officials are not strict enough, they let the game get out of hand in far too many games. Rather than make too many rule changes, a careful analysis should be made to determine the value and effect of the current rules. Another suggestion regarding the rules is to have an appropriate rule structure for the various levels in amateur and professional hockey. The professional rules and interpretations relating to penalties are totally inappropriate if we are to create a proper environment for amateur hockey. Structure the rules at the amateur level so that intimidation and retaliation are removed from the game. All efforts should be made to structure the rules to maximize skill development, for the more skill a youngster develops the less reliance he will place on aggression and violence.

Interpretation of infractions by officials is the key to cleaning up much of the violence which occurs in hockey, especially amateur hockey. It is not possible for the game to be officiated at the amateur level as done at the professional level. Officials must call penalties for infractions at the amateur level that would normally be ignored at the professional level. At both levels, but more so at the amateur level, there should be a very marked distinction between a clean hard body check and intentional "cheap shots". It is unfortunate that more people do not appreciate the effect that toleration or encouraging even small infractions, outside of the rules and after the whistle, can have on the character of a game and

the participants.

If there are any major rule changes to be made they should concentrate on the severity of punishment. At present many of the penalties are not severe enough. The negative aspect does not outweigh the positive aspect of taking a penalty. For instances, if a player deliberately attempts to injure an opponent, he should be banished from the game and heavily fined (in the case of professional hockey). This would place more emphasis on the negative aspect and detract the players from using this tactic. Also, many penalties should be changed whereby the team suffers instead of just the player, as in the case of misconducts. It also appears that punishment handed out by league officials (referee-in-chief and the presidents) are not severe enough, in terms of suspensions and fines. Increasing these will no doubt have players think twice about becoming involved in a serious incident on the ice.

Referring back to the interpretation of rules, officials must become more aware of the aggressor in many altercations. In the present rule structure the aggressor or instigator can receive an additional penalty. Unfortunately the aggressor is seldom singled out, which results in much of the retaliation. If players know that the aggressor in a fighting or "high-sticking" incident will receive a more severe penalty, they will find it to their advantage to turn away more often. The thinking of players now is that, "if you are going to receive a penalty regardless of who the aggressor is, then you might as well make it worthwhile." The sooner steps

are taken to see that fighting, intimidation, retaliation and provocation of an opponent are no longer advantageous to a team, or "part of the game", the healthier hockey will be.

Administration

Administratively, amateur and professional bodies are as much to blame for violence as are the players, coaches and fans. If the respective governing bodies would place greater emphasis on the purposes and objectives which stress clean sportsmanlike hockey, it would be easier for the rest of the participants to comply.

Administrators at the professional level are only concerned with profits and ensuring that the league remain functional. Many of the coaches and players feel that if there are going to be changes, they must come from the "top". The administrators of the league have the authority and power to initiate change. They are the ones who, in essence, control the fate of hockey at both levels, particularly at the amateur level where administrators become more directly involved with the total program. Here the administration is not confronted with team owners, directors and governors who are associated with particular teams in the league. In professional hockey interests are somewhat conflicting in that they are concerned with the operation of the league as well as having an interest in the operation of their individual team. For example, the board of governors are not going to approve or legislate rule changes and recommendations that will affect the profits of a team (in terms of spectator demand and attendance), even if the changes reduce violence. This is generally not a problem faced by amateur bodies.

A suggestion which is both logical and realistic is to have government become more involved in administrative duties. Since the government has not got a direct financial interest in the league itself, it could offer relatively unbiased assistance. The amateur level could benefit greatly from government involvement, particularly, in terms of financial assistance. Presently, a large portion of operational costs at the amateur level come from professional support and gate receipts. It is not a healthy situation in amateur sport to have the regulatory body depend on either the professionals or the box office to sustain themselves (William Murtry, Toronto, May, 1974). The financial assistance should be directed at, education and certification of coaches, instruction and certification of officials, education of public (particularly parents), support of research. To some extent the government could control the jurisdiction of professional bodies, which indirectly might affect the style and emphasis of the game. Further research is needed into this area for one to adequately assess its influence and value.

Although it was not the purpose of this chapter to delve into proposals for change, the author subjectively feels that the administration of hockey (amateur and professional) needs to be carefully investigated if we wish to create a better environment for the game.

Players, Coaches, Parents and Fans

When attempting to change or reform violent behavior a certain amount of responsibility should be placed on the players, coaches and

parents (amateur level). Unless you receive the cooperation from the players and coaches, change becomes a very difficult task. Once the players and coaches become educated to more appropriate behavior, there will likely follow a noticeable improvement in the attitude of the parents and fans. In amateur hockey there should be a direct attempt made to reach the parent.

In professional hockey the majority of players realize that the game can be very entertaining and enjoyable when played within the confines of the rules, both official and unofficial. For this to occur all teams and players must conform to similar philosophies. Diverging from a standard philosophy and/or objectives ultimately results in the use of inappropriate strategy (i.e., tactical use of violence) to win. The players must also realize that resorting to too much violence could possibly lead to the demise of professional hockey. Many felt that this was one of the reasons why lacrosse died in North America.

How can the players instigate change if the owners and policy makers refuse to go along with their suggestions? The players are in no position to fight the management and administration. A decade ago this was in fact true, but with the formation of professional Players' Associations, the players have now received more power and, within reason, demand certain changes. This is one very logical way in which the players can help make hockey a respectable game again. By encouraging clean hockey and refraining from intimidation, retaliation and violent behavior the

players can indirectly change the attitudes and ideology of the fan and management. If it is possible to fill the arenas with clean hockey, the owners will go along with this style.

Amateur hockey players are not faced with the same pressures as professional players. By educating the coaches and parents to the proper methods and development programs, the player will adapt more readily. It would seem fair to say that amateur players, especially youngsters, are more susceptible to change.

There are many coaches who are not properly qualified to coach in amateur hockey. The coach has a dramatic affect on the behavior of his players. Having an irresponsible, non-qualified coach can create many problems. It is the responsibility of the executives and administrators to make sure there are qualified coaches in amateur hockey. It should be mandatory that all coaches be certified and introduced to the philosophies and purposes of amateur hockey. This requires a meeting with coaches, officials, parents and players since change will never occur unless all individuals involved are in common agreement. This is especially important when individuals are attempting to change a behavioral pattern that already exists. Once having been certified, they should be evaluated occasionally to see if they are conducting themselves in a proper manner. The minor coach should and can be the most significant individual in determining the attitude and behavior of his players. If it is apparent that the coach is condoning or encouraging a violent approach, he should be disciplined. Obviously, this will require further financial assistance and manpower, but at the moment seems most practical

and warrants further support. This is where the government could help positively.

The professional hockey coach not only has the responsibility for the conduct of his players, but he is often put in a prestigious position and emulated by many amateur coaches. Following the model of some professional coaches, many amateur coaches are emphasizing the importance of aggression in winning hockey games, and the use of intimidation as a tactical device. The coaches are put in the same position as players when it comes to imitating highly successful role models. Hoping to obtain the same success as the professional coach, the amateur coach adopts the same philosophy. Therefore the professional coach must provide the amateur coach with a suitable model to follow.

When viewing possibilities for change at the amateur level, more information should be directed at the parents. If change is in order we must receive cooperation and aid from the boys' parents. The parents must be aware of the purposes and philosophies of amateur hockey. This could be done by preparing a statement which would be forwarded to each parent of all registered players. Included in the statement could be information on proper attitudes, coaching techniques and the effect of competition on youngsters. Most parents are extremely pleased to receive guidance and advice from interested experts as to the proper way to motivate their children without the adverse results that often occur with the most well-intentioned but uninformed parent (Percival, 1974).

To watch and listen to parents at a local minor hockey game, one

is inclined to agree that they need to be re-educated to the proper methods of motivation and to the most suitable priorities for minor hockey. It has become apparent that if change is to be successful, then there must be uniform and consistent reinforcement from all significant others (coaches, parents and fans).

In summary, when looking at possibilities for change the study explored three different avenues; the rule structure, administration, and significant others and players. Many of the recommendations or proposals are applicable both at the amateur and professional levels, with some being more specific to each level (ie: parents - amateur hockey). The author should mention that these are by no means all of the possible changes that could be made. However, from personal observation and data collected for this thesis, the author feels that they might start the hockey subculture on its way to reform.

In the first section of the chapter the author attempted to explain and interpret the various theories on aggression and violence, and their relevance to the nature and causes of violence in hockey. It became apparent that the social learning theory where behavior is learned through a socialization process, was the most appropriate explanation for violent behavior and aggression in hockey. The second section dealt with the net effect of the professionals on violence and aggression for the total hockey subculture. The specific areas where the professionals appeared to have the most effect were: role modelling-emulation of professionals, producing a "winning-at-any-cost".

effect, and the adverse connotations given to media exposure that professionals received. In an attempt to offer a solution to the problem concerning violence and unnecessary aggression, the next section included information and recommendations outlining possibilities for change. If we are going to see any change in the existing structure, it must come from both levels of hockey, no one level can possibly single-handedly correct or rid hockey of unnecessary violence. Each must cooperate with the other.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. SUMMARY

The purpose of this study was to investigate the nature and causes of overt aggressive behavior and violence in the North America hockey subculture. Documentation and observation of the hockey subculture tended to suggest that violence and overt aggression may be explained to a great extent by the social learning theory in so far as players are socialized into violent-oriented roles. It was found that the two remaining theories of aggression, the instinct theory and the frustration-aggression theory, appeared to hold somewhat less explanatory power. However, no one theory could be considered a total explanation of violence in hockey. The study did reveal that while the latter two explanations are publicly prevalent, under examination they account for violence to a lesser degree than the social learning theory in which behavior is basically acquired and/or learned.

The study utilized three distinct methods in examining the nature and causes of violence in hockey: (1) the primary method was the participant-observer approach characteristic of the occupational sociological study; (2) documentary research which screened media reports, official publications from various organizational levels of hockey, and a number of studies commissioned to examine hockey violence; and (3) an unstructured interview with a sample of pre-professional and professional players. The technique used to

analyze the data was largely done through role analysis. The researcher made use of it as a central technique for the analysis of the structure and functioning of the hockey subculture, and for the explanation of individual and group behavior. It was acknowledged that this technique of analysis appears to be basic to the socialization process.

Related literature associated with overt aggression and violent behavior, and the hockey environment was analyzed in considerable detail in Chapters II and IV, both at the amateur and professional levels. There was sufficient evidence to show that there appeared to be an increasing trend of violence in North American hockey, resulting in creation of a problem deserving to be investigated. The major concern here is that violence and overt aggressive behavior has become associated with the sport and accepted throughout almost all competitive levels as somewhat legitimate and sanctioned as an integral part of the game. Although the study did not deal with the minor hockey structure in detail, it did become evident that the problem associated with violence has become a social problem producing an unhealthy atmosphere and environment for our youth. The latter section of Chapter IV introduced the socialization process whereby players become confronted with various possible violent roles available in hockey.

Chapter V dealt with in detail the characteristics and interactions of the violent-oriented roles, and attempted to explain the socialization process whereby the roles are acquired and maintained.

By this, the study hopefully provided some insight into the process and just how individual players become associated with violent behavior.

From here the author went on to discuss and interpret the causes of violence in Chapter VI. This data interpretation, relative to the various theories outlined in Chapter II suggested that violence and overt aggressive tendencies are for the most part learned or acquired, as explained by the social learning theory. The chapter also discussed the net effect professional hockey, in its present structure, has on violence. The present data suggested that the professionals (pre-professionals included) have a significant effect. This effect tended to come from three main areas:

1. The emulation factor - professionals do not all provide the best model image to identify with.
2. The structure itself - it is professionally oriented to the ultimate goal of winning regardless of strategy and methods employed.
3. The media exposure - in that the media is indirectly responsible for magnifying the violence at the professional level.

It was felt that if these three areas of concern were dealt with in a constructive way, the violence in hockey could possibly be decreased, and that both levels of competition (amateur and professional) must cooperate if an effective program is to take place.

In the latter section of Chapter VI the study dealt with possibilities for change which might alleviate some of the existing forms of reactive aggression and violence. These possibilities for change dealt with three areas:

1. Rule Structure
2. Administration
3. Players, coaches, spectators and parents (were applicable).

The suggested changes were limited to those that could be implemented immediately and to those which could be realistically incorporated without changing the overall structure.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That information such as is contained in this thesis become available to government officials and amateur and professional governing bodies (CAHA, NHL, WHA), so that the problem of violence and reactive aggression might be dealt with more effectively.
2. That material be made available, as well as clinics involving coaches, parents and administrative officials, so that the objectives and purposes of amateur and professional hockey be clearly understood and adhered to by all.
3. That further support be given to the study of sports psychology of athletes and coaching techniques and methods. This could involve the Government, to a greater extent, and major professional governing bodies,

in terms of financial support for the above recommendations.

4. That this study be followed by additional studies which further investigate the problem of violence in both amateur and professional hockey such as:

- statistical analysis of the increase of violence in professional hockey during the past 20 years. This type of study might disclose any trends which statistically show evidence for an increase of violent behavior.
- an indepth advanced investigation into violence in minor hockey (7-17), particularly the nature and causes.
- a detailed study which explores the effect of the media on violence in hockey, and submit proposals which might aid the media in alleviating the violence in the hockey subculture.
- an indepth investigation into the administrative governing bodies of both amateur and professional hockey.

5. That the proposals for change outlined in Chapter VI be implemented at all levels of hockey, and that these be evaluated to determine their effectiveness and practicality.

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APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW EXCERPTS

The following are some examples of excerpts taken from the interviews with pre-professional and professional hockey players. It should be noted that tape recording and/or note-taking techniques were not used during the actual interview. The proceedings of the interview were transformed into written form shortly following the interview. The researcher has a complete documentation of all interviews on record.

Junior A. (pre-professional) Hockey Players (Age 17-19)

The pro. "scouts" expect you to have the ability to take care of yourself on the ice.

I am not a very good hockey player skill wise, therefore, I have to take advantage of my physical abilities. Besides, the coach expects me to fight.

If someone backs down from a fight it's not good for team morale.

Most of all, though, a good fight is enjoyable. There is nothing like fighting it out with a guy who's giving you trouble.

We have the reputation as being tough and intimidating, therefore we almost become forced to play this style of game.

During the past few years the job of the policeman, goon, etc., has become almost a necessity. Teams are recruiting and/or asking their players to play rough and sometimes dirty to win. It's too bad teams have to resort to this kind of tactic, it spoils the game.

If a player uses his stick on me I'll use my stick on him. It is an equalizer against goons, etc.

I honestly think there has been an increase in violent behavior over the past five years or more.

I realize that I am the club policeman, but it doesn't bother me that much. It becomes a job that is expected of me, and is just as important as the checkers and the goal scorers.

It seems as if the media and spectators expect and at the same time enjoy seeing fights and some forms of violence on the ice, and in junior we certainly cater to this style. Nowadays, the hockey seems to be structured to this style. I don't think it is instinct that accounts for the violence and aggression you speak of.

Much of the fighting etc. becomes a matter of recognition...Behavior which impresses the coach and pro "scouts".

Professional Hockey Players (Rookies)

I was accepted more for my fighting than for scoring goals...During the fights the fans cheered more than if I had scored a goal.

I am a professional and within reason I will do anything the team ask of me...Even if it means being the tough guy or policeman.

Rookies are always tested, you have to stand up to the punishment or get out...Establishing yourself early makes it easier in the long run, but you can't take on all comers. You have to kinda pick your spots.

Spearing is the most dangerous infraction in hockey. I think I would use my stick if someone used their stick on me. It sort of becomes a personal vendetta against the player who speared you.

Being the policeman I am a valuable part of the team. Since it is one of my assets, I'll take advantage of it.

Intimidating the opposition is a vital tactic in hockey today. I have developed a technique for intimidating the opposition. It's all part of the game.

Professional Hockey Player (Veteran)

I have built up a reputation as being the enforcer or protector, and they respect me for the job. I'll continue as long as possible. In a way it has given me some security in today's hockey. It has no doubt extended my career.

Once you become labelled as a policeman or goon, you are then expected to conform. The coach and players expect you to perform accordingly. Sometimes it is hard to readjust or drop the role.

Rétaliation has become an essential part of the game and the rules must be changed if you want to stop it. Personal pride usually instigates much of the retaliation. A player can't back down before his teammates or fans.

It becomes a matter of protecting yourself, to a certain extent. By showing that you will use your stick or elbow when the opposition intimidates you, you can ward off the intimidators and/or antagonizers. The superstar often uses this tactic..

APPENDIX B

RULE CHANGES FOR AMATEUR HOCKEY (1975)

Since there has been a general concern with violence in hockey, the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association has adopted several key recommendations by its rules committee aimed at reducing some of the more violent aspects of the game.

As a result, fighting, cross-checking, high-sticking, head-butting, or hair-pulling, and molesting or mistreatment of referees and linesmen by players, coaches or team officials, will all be dealt with more severely. In all there were some 103 rule change proposals, with the majority of major changes being accepted by the rules committee.

Some of the major changes were: in the event of a fight a player identified as the instigator or aggressor will be given a game misconduct penalty in addition to the five-minute major penalty normally assessed for the offence. A two-minute minor penalty will be given to any player who, having been struck by an opponent, retaliates or attempts to retaliate. A ten-minute misconduct or game misconduct will also carry with it an automatic two-minute minor penalty. This leaves the offending player's team one man short for the two-minute span.

In an effort to eliminate possible injuries from cross-checking or high-sticking infractions, two new rules were inserted in the rule book. A major penalty "to be given any player who strikes an opponent above the height of his shoulders" with a cross-check or a high stick, whether or not injury occurs. If a player de-

liberately injures or attempts to injure an opponent through either infraction, he will be assessed a match penalty. In addition, a player who knocks down the puck while his stick is above his shoulder will be given a minor penalty and play will be halted immediately.

Regarding the players who indulge in head-butting, hair-pulling or any other "unnecessary roughness" will be subject to a match penalty "in addition to any other penalties they may incur".

The CAHA has openly stated that, "these are major changes which were intended to reduce violence in hockey." (Edmonton Journal, May 22, 1975).